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INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' stands as one of the most
significant legacies of the civil rights movement. Intended to remedy
the injustice of workplace discrimination,2 Title VII embodies the
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-715, 716(c), 717-718, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994)).
2. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (observing that purpose of
Title VII was "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees").
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movement's pursuit of equal opportunity in employment. It covers
nearly every aspect of the employer-employee relationship, prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.' To administer and enforce its broad proscriptions against
employment discrimination, Title VII established the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") vested
with the authority to investigate and resolve discrimination com-
plaints.' Under Title VII, an aggrieved individual can sue in federal
district court once the EEOC finds probable cause to believe the
charge is true and mediation of the complaint fails.5 As originally
enacted, Title VII authorized only equitable relief for discrimination
victims.6
The promise of equal employment opportunity remained unful-
filled, however, nearly three decades after the passage of Title VII.7
Employment discrimination persisted, while criticism of Title VII's
remedial scheme mounted.8 Spurred by Supreme Court rulings
perceived as eroding civil rights protection,9 those advocating
expanded Title VII remedies stressed the need to adequately
compensate discrimination victims while making discriminatory
practices prohibitively expensive for employers. 10 The ensuing
debate culminated in the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 199111
("1991 Act").
The 1991 Act amended Title VII to provide victims of discrimina-
tion with compensatory and punitive damages. 2 In addition, the
1991 Act entitles employees seeking damages to demand a jury
trial. 3 By "shift[ing] the emphasis of Title VII from conciliation
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (defining "unlawful employment practice" as failing or refusing
to hire, discharging, or otherwise discriminating with respect to "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of... race, color, sex, or national origin").
4. See id. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-12.
5. See id. § 2000e-5(f).
6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 259 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)).
7. See 137 CONG. REC. H3857 (daily ed.June 5, 1991) (statement of Rep. Lent) (admitting
that although great progress has been made since Civil Rights Act of 1964, more needs to be
done to eradicate workplace discrimination).
8. See 137 CONG. REc. H3480 (daily ed. May 22, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hink) (decrying
remedial scheme of Title VII because victims of discrimination were entitled only to back pay
or reinstatement).
9. See infra Part lA (discussing events leading to passage of Civil Rights Act of 1991).
10. See infra Part I.B.1 (examining rationale for expanded remedial scheme and
compensatory damages under Titie VII).
11. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in various sections of 29
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
12. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
13. See id. § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
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with equitable remedies to litigation with tort-like damage awards,"14
the 1991 Act effected a radical change in the nature of employment
discrimination law.15
Unclear at first was the 1991 Act's impact on the administrative
process' 6 established under Title VII to adjudicate equal employment
opportunity ("EEO") complaints by federal employees.'7 Although
the 1991 Act permits recovery of compensatory damages in Title VII
court actions,' 8 it is silent on whether compensatory damages are
available in administrative proceedings. The EEOC resolved this issue
14. Maj. Charles B. Hernicz, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: From Conciliation to Litigation-How
Congress Delegates Lawmaking to the Courts, 141 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1993).
15. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 n.12 (1992) (expressing belief that
"Congress' decision to permit jury trials and compensatory damages under [Title VII as
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991] signals a marked change in its conception of the injury
redressable by Title VII").
16. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (codifying § 11 of The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 111, which amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to cover
federal employees). Section 2000e-16 authorizes the EEOC to promulgate rules and regulations
for the enforcement of Title VII in the federal sector. See id. § 2000e-16(b); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614 (1996) (enumerating administrative procedures for processing complaints filed by federal
employees).
17. SeeCharles W. Hemingway, A Review ofAdministrative Compensatory Damage AwardDecisions
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 41 FED. B. NEWs &J. 688, 689 (1994) ("During most of the first
year after the [1991 Act] took effect, the EEOC grappled with whether Congress intended that
compensatory damages be awarded to federal employees at the administrative stage of
discrimination complaint processing (i.e., before the complainant sought relief in a federal
court).").
For those unfamiliarwith the administrative complaint process for federal employees, a brief
outline of the procedure is in order. The employee initiates the process by contacting an
agency EEO counselor and filing an informal complaint within 45 days after the alleged
incident. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Thirty to 90 days of informal investigation and
mediation follow. See id, § 1614.105(e)-(f). During this period, counselors advise the complain-
ant of his rights and responsibilities in an effort to resolve the matter. See id. § 1614.105(a)-(b).
No later than 15 days after the conclusion of informal counseling, the employee must file a
formal complaint, see id. § 1614.106(b), which the agency either may accept or dismiss. See id.
§ 1614.107. Should the agency elect to dismiss the complaint, the employee has 30 days to
appeal the decision to the EEOC Office of Federal Operations ("OFO"), the division of the
EEOC responsible for administering the complaint process for federal sector employees. See id.
§§ 1614.402(a), .403(a). Should the agency choose to accept the complaint, it must complete
an investigation and issue a report to the complainant within 180 days. See id. § 1614.108(e).
The complainant then has 30 days to request a hearing with an EEOC administrative judge
("AJ"). See id. If the complainant declines to do so, the agency has 60 days to issue a final
agency decision ("FAD") resolving the complaint. See id. § 1614.110. In the event that the
complainant does request a hearing, an EEOC AJ will hear the case and enter a finding as to
the alleged discrimination and the appropriate relief. See id. § 1614.109(g) (ordering final
decision within 180 days unless AJ has good cause for granting extension). The agency then
issues its FAD within 60 days of the AJ's determination. See id. § 1614.110. Once the agency has
issued its FAD, the complainant has 30 days to appeal the decision to the OFO. See id
§ 1614.402(a). Finally, the complainant may appeal the OFO's ruling to the EEOC commission-
ers by filing within 30 days of the OFO decision a request to reopen and reconsider. See id.
§ 1614.407(b). If the EEOC declines to reconsider the complaint, or more than 120 days pass
from instigation of the complaint, the complainant may seek relief in federal district court. See
it. § 1614.410.
18. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1) (1994).
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with its holding in Jackson v. United States Postal Service, 9 interpreting
the 1991 Act as affording compensatory damages at the administrative
stage of discrimination charge processing.
20
EEOC administrative judges ("AJ") and federal agency EEO
practitioners, faced with the amalgam of tort and employment
discrimination law created by the 1991 Act, reacted to the Jackson
decision with consternation. As one commentator remarked, the
introduction of "tort law concepts" to the analysis of discrimination
complaints "troubled the federal legal, EEO and personnel communi-
ties to no end, and all.., looked to the EEOC for guidance."
21
The Commission responded to these concerns by developing an
analytical framework for addressing compensatory damages issues.
22
With regard to assessing nonpecuniary losses in particular, the EEOC
articulated a standard for gauging an appropriate award23 and
indicated it would rely on cases awarding nonpecuniary damages
under other civil rights statutes for guidance. 24 In only a few cases,
however, has the Commission actually quantified an appropriate
award. Of the nearly 200 reported EEOC decisions that addressed the
issue of compensatory damages, only five determined that a specific
monetary award constituted adequate compensation for intangible
injuries stemming from discrimination.2 5
19. E.E.O.C. No. 01923399, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062 (1992).
20. Jackson v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01923399, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062, at XII-
185 (1992).
21. Hemingway, supra note 17, at 688; see ERNESr C. HADLEY, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL SECrOR
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW & PRACrICE 1032 (1996) ("Agencies and complainants alike have long
awaited some definitive rulings on the part of the EEOC that would begin to take compensatory
damages out of the realm of theory and into the realm of actual dollars and cents.").
22. See EEOC Dec. No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive Damages
Available Under § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 1992 WL 189089 (July 14, 1992) [hereinafter
EEOC Enforcement Guidance].
23. See Carpenter v. Department of Agric., 95 F.E.O.R. 3229, at XII-147 (1995) (requiring
that compensatory damage award satisfy two goals: "that it not be 'monstrously excessive'
standing alone and that it be consistent with similar awards made in similar cases" (quoting
Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989))).
24. See EEOCEnforcement Guidance, supra note 22, at *11 n.13 ("Cases awarding compensato-
ry... damages under other civil rights statutes will be used for guidance in analyzing the
availability of damages under [the 1991 Act].").
25. Search of WESTLAW, FLB library, EEOC file (Aug. 9, 1996) (search for cases citing
Jackson v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01923399 (Nov. 12, 1992)). The EEOC has
issued 187 rulings (including appellate decisions by the EEOC OFO) addressing the issue of
compensatory damages. Of those, five determined a finite award for intangible injuries. See
Smith v. Department of Defense, E.E.O.C. No. 01943844, 96 F.E.O.R. 3164, at XII-194 (1996)
(awarding $25,000 for emotional distress stemming from sexual harassment); Lawrence v. United
States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01952288, 96 F.E.O.R. 3150, at XII-135 (1996) (concluding
victim of sexual harassment was entitled to $3000 for mental anguish and emotional distress);
Wallis v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01950510, 96 F.E.O.R. 3044, at XII-153 (1995)
(awarding $50,000 for nonpecuniary damages in mental disability discrimination and reprisal
case); Carpenter v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01945652, 95 F.E.O.R. 3229, at XII-147
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Given the inherent uncertainty of ascribing monetary value to pain
and suffering 6 or emotional distress,2" the incorporation of com-
pensatory damages within the administrative remedial scheme
presents the potential for inadequate or excessive awards. An
insufficient award denies the aggrieved employee the relief Congress
intended to provide;28 unwarranted compensation might encourage
meritless complaints. 9  Moreover, inconsistent compensatory
damage awards"° can serve to discourage negotiated settlements-an
agency has less incentive to settle when it cannot estimate the sum
likely to be awarded should a complainant prevail, and the existence
of inordinate awards in the past might induce a complainant to hold
out for a larger award.
The purpose of this Comment is to aid EEOC AJs and federal
agency EEO practitioners in assessing nonpecuniary compensatory
damages.3' Part I presents a brief history of the debate over
(1995) (finding compensatory damages of $75,000 adequate award for intangible injury where
appellant alleged reprisal and discrimination based on age and disability); Rountree v.
Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01941906,95 F.E.O.R. 3223, at XII-124 (1995) (determining
that $8,000 properly compensated appellant for nonpecuniary harm stemming from low
performance appraisal motivated by racial and sex discrimination).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1977) ("There is no scale by which
the detriment caused by suffering can be measured and hence there can be only a very rough
correspondence between the amount awarded as damages and the extent of the suffering.");
Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 778 (1985)
("Translating pain and suffering or emotional distress into monetary terms poses tremendous
problems of proof. Such injuries have no measurable dimensions, mathematical or financial.")
(footnote omitted).
27. SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 905 cmt. i ("[T]here is no rule ofcertaintywith
reference to the amount of recovery permitted for any particular type of emotional distress; the
only limit is such an amount as a reasonable person could possibly estimate as fair compensa-
tion."); see also Carpenter, 95 F.E.O.L 3229, at XII-147 ("[D]amage awards for emotional harm
are difficult to determine and ... there are no definitive rules governing the amount to be
awarded in given cases.").
28. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (stating
as one of Act's purposes "to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and
unlawful harassment in the work place").
29. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 70 (1991) (noting that opponents of 1991 Act argued
that availability of damages would "scuttle Titie VII's goal of encouraging voluntary settlement");
137 CONG. REc. H3874 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Doman) (charging that
possibility of high damage awards would create a "litigation machine"); see also Hemingway, supra
note 17, at 702 (warning that "there is a real danger that unvarranted or unproven compensa-
tory damages claims will further clog an already burdened system"); infra note 74 (providing
statistical evidence of unprecedented increase in discrimination complaints following enactment
of 1991 Act).
30. Compare Nichelson v. Quaker Oats Co., 573 F. Supp. 1209, 1231 (W.D. Tenn. 1983)
(awarding $1000 in compensatory damages when employer retaliated by demoting and denying
promotion after plaintiff filed race discrimination suit), revd on other grounds, 752 F.2d 1153 (6th
Cir.), vacated, 472 U.S. 1004 (1985), with Richards v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 668 F. Supp.
259 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (granting $15,000 in compensatory damages when employer denied
promotion on basis of race), afid, 842 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1988).
31. Merit System Protection Board ("MSPB") AJs and practitioners also may find this
Comment to be of some value. The MSPB recently adopted the EEOC's holding inJackson for
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expanded Title VII remedies which preceded the passage of the 1991
Act. In addition, Part I explores the damages provisions of the 1991
Act. Part II focuses on the EEOC's response to the 1991 Act,
outlining the analytical framework the EEOC established for
evaluating compensatory damage claims with particular emphasis on
the factors and standard of measure the Commission considers in
quantifying nonpecuniary losses. Finally, Part III surveys compensato-
ry damages awards in federal civil rights cases to identify factors
weighed in the determination of particular sums. For EEOC AJs and
federal agency EEO practitioners unfamiliar with evaluating nonpecu-
niary harm, this analysis should provide some guidance in approximat-
ing damages in similar cases.
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991-EXPANDING TITLE VII
REMEDIES
A. Prologue
By enacting the 1991 Act, Congress responded to several Supreme
Court decisions which retreated from previous advances in civil rights
and EEO jurisprudence.32 In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,33 for
example, the Court's holding severely curtailed the scope of protec-
tion against racial discrimination afforded by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 34
Section 1981 grants to all persons, inter alia, the right to make and
the proposition that the 1991 Act entitles federal sector complainants to compensatory damages
in the merit system protection administrative process. See Hocker v. Department of Transp., 63
M.S.P.B. 497, 505 (1994); cf Ignacio v. United States Postal Serv., 30 M.S.P.B. 471, 481 (1986)
(declaring that in matters concerning discrimination laws, MSPB must give due deference to
EEOC).
32. See Hernicz, supra note 14, at 4 & n.18 (stating that 1991 Act was intended to "restore"
civil rights law in response to several Supreme Court decisions (citing Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989) (narrowly interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as inapplicable
to cases of racial discrimination in the course of employment); Independent Fed'n of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761 (1989) (holding that intervenors in Title VII actions are
not liable for attorneys' fees unless their actions are frivolous); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (limiting liability in mixed-motive claim under Title VII); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (shifting to plaintiff burden of proof to
demonstrate particular employment practice was cause of disparate-impact claim under Title
VII); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989) (sanctioning collateral challenges to
affirmative action consent decrees); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911 (1989)
(holding statute of limitations period for Title VII action challenging seniority system runs from
date system is adopted, not from time it is applied to complainant))).
33. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
34. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 179 (holding that racial harassment in course of employment
is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which "covers only conduct at the initial formation of
the contract and conduct which impairs the right to enforce contract obligations through legal
process").
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enforce contracts. 5 Prior to Patterson, courts interpreted § 1981 to
cover victims of on-thejob racial or ethnic discrimination. 6 In those
instances, § 1981 provided equitable as well as compensatory relief
and, in particularly egregious cases, punitive damages.3" This
protection extended to both public and private contractual rela-
tions 3 and applied to all employers regardless of the number of
their employees.39
In Patterson, the plaintiff sued her employer, alleging harassment,
failure to promote, and wrongful discharge on the basis of her
race.40  The Court strictly interpreted the so-called "make and
enforce contracts" clause of § 1981,41 declaring that the statute
applied only to racial discrimination in the "formation of a contract,
... not to problems that may arise later from the conditions of
continuing employment."42 Consequently, the Court held that racial
harassment engendering a hostile work environment was not
actionable under § 1981." 3
National civil rights organizations decried the Patterson decision as
a profound rollback of civil rights protection under federal law.44
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Section 1981 states:
All persons ... shall have the same right... to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of'every kind,
and to no other.
Id.
36. See, e.g., Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 201-03 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying
§ 1981 to racial discrimination in training, wages, and discharge); Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d
1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying § 1981 to determine whether employee was constructively
discharged on basis of race); Richards v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 668 F. Supp. 259, 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (challenging discriminatory denial of promotion under § 1981 on basis of race);
see also St. Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (interpreting § 1981 as
prohibiting discrimination on basis of "ancestry or ethnic characteristics").
37. SeeJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975); see also Garner
v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978) (interpreting § 1981 to permit compensatory
damages for suffering and humiliation).
38. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459-60; see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976)
(applying § 1981 to challenge discriminatory admissions policies of private schools); Tillman
v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431,439-40 (1973) (holding that private swim club
with discriminatory guest policy was not exempt from § 1981); cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 441-43 & n.78 (1968) (implying that § 1981 reaches purely private acts of racial
discrimination).
39. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460 ("Section 1981 is not coextensive in its coverage with Title
VII. The latter is made inapplicable to certain employers." (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970
ed., Supp. III))).
40. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 169 (1989).
41. See supra note 35 (quoting language of 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
42. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176 (emphasis added).
43. See id. at 178.
44. See Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromims and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict
Between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,46 RuTGERs L. REv. 1, 23 (1993)
("National civil rights organizations and their allies in Congress denounced the decision[) in
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Critics of the Patterson decision argued that because § 1981 applied to
all employers regardless of the number of employees, whereas Title
VII did not cover businesses with a work force of fewer than fifteen,'
the Supreme Court's narrow reading of § 1981 effectively stripped
equal employment coverage and remedies from the employees of 3.7
million small businesses.4 6
Patterson and the several other Supreme Court decisions viewed as
rolling back federal civil rights protections,47 however, were not the
sole impetus for the 1991 Act. Commentators have identified at least
three other factors prompting the congressional debate surrounding
amending Title VII: (1) the difference in remedies between § 1981
and Title VII,48 (2) society's heightened sensitivity to sexual harass-
ment in the workplace,49 and (3) the trend in state statutes toward
fashioning legal and equitable relief for employment discrimina-
tion. 0 The issue of Title VII remedies, however, dominated the
debate that culminated in the passage of the 1991 Act. 1
B. The Debate Surrounding Compensatory Damages Under Title VII
1. The argument for compensatory damages
Despite the 1991 Act's original purpose to "restore" federal civil
rights law, 2 drafters of the legislation soon embraced the sweeping
goal of extending the remedies available under § 1981 to victims of
intentional discrimination on the bases of sex, religion, national
strong (and sometimes vitriolic) rhetoric.").
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 91 (1991).
47. See supra note 32 (listing several Supreme Court decisions that 1991 Act addressed).
48. See Govan, supra note 44, at 57 (stating that supporters of 1991 Act argued that "it was
a matter of simple equity to eliminate the preferential status of race discrimination cases and
provide to victims of gender, religious, national origin, and disability discrimination the remedies
long available to victims of race discrimination").
49. SeeMichael W. Roskiewicz, Note, Title VWIRemedies: Lifting the Statutoy Caps from the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to Achieve Equal Remediesfor Employment Discrimination, 43 WASH. U.J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 391, 397 (1993) (stating that growing hostility toward minorities, women, and
disabled persons in workplace influenced Congress to expand scope of remedies available to
victims of employment discrimination).
50. See id. at 400 (stating that state-level expansion of discrimination remedies influenced
Congress to expand scope of Tite VII remedies); see also MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES IN
EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 5 n.21 (James J. McDonald, Jr. & Francine B. Kulick eds., 1994)
[hereinafter MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES] (citing state employment discrimination statutes
permitting recovery of compensatory damages).
51. SeeZachary D. Fasman, PracticalProblems of the CivilRightsAct WASH. POST,July 23,1990,
at All (citing allowance of compensatory and punitive damages as serious practical problem in
debate over 1991 Act).
52. See Govan, supra note 44, at 16.
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origin, and disability.5 3 Proponents argued that providing monetary
relief would give victims of non-racial discrimination the same
remedies which had long been available under federal civil rights laws
to victims of racial discrimination. 4 The preference in remedies
accorded victims of racial discrimination, the drafters argued, was
inequitable and without justification." As the House Education and
Labor Committee noted in its report accompanying the 1991 Act, sex
and religious discrimination are as insidious as discrimination on the
basis of race and therefore warrant equal remedies for the purpose of
making victims whole."6
Congressional supporters also recognized the inadequacy of the
remedial scheme under Title VII.57 Prior to the 1991 Act, victims of
intentional discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, national
origin, or disability only were entitled to equitable remedies, including
injunctive relief, hiring or reinstatement, and up to two years' back
pay."8 The vast majority of courts declined to award legal remedies
under Title VII 9 Thus, no matter how egregious the discrimina-
53. See id. at 35-36. The National Women's Law Center, supported by the Women's Legal
Defense Fund, first advocated the expansion of legal remedies and availability ofjury trials in
cases of intentional discrimination based on factors other than race. See id. The move to
expand remedies and provide the right to a jury trial, however, was not completely free of
political motive. The Legal Defense and Education Fund, another member of the drafting
committee, favored the proposal as a check to the influence of the federal judiciary, largely
consisting of Reagan/Bush appointees, as the exclusive fact-finder in Title VII employment
discrimination cases. See id. at 36.
54. See id. at 57.
55. See id.
56. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 65 (1991).
57. See Govan, supra note 44, at 57.
58. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994). The relief
provision reads as follows:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful
employment practice.., the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.
Id.
59. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 458 (1975) ("Some
District Courts have ruled that neither compensatory nor punitive damages may be awarded in
the Title VII suit."); Mitchell v. Seaboard Sys. RR, 883 F.2d 451, 452 (6th Cir. 1989)
(acknowledging that although equitable relief is available to Title VII complainants,
compensatory damages are not); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1443 (10th
Cir. 1988) (affirming that compensatory damages are not awardable in Title VII employment
discrimination suits); Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988)
(refusing to award compensatory damages in Title VII action); Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799
F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir. 1986) (ruling that compensatory damages are not available under Title
VII); Protos v. Volkswagen ofnAm., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 138-39 (3d Cir. 1986) (declaring that Title
VII makes no provision for legal remedies such as compensatory damages); Walker v. Ford
Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1363-64 (11th Cir. 1982) (adopting general view that compensatory
damages are not awardable under Title VII); Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 642 F.2d 268,
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tion, victims were unable to recover compensatory damages despite
the emotional suffering, physical pain, and related medical expenses
that can accompany such stigmatizing treatment.6"
In addition, Title VII's equitable relief was all but a legal fiction for
those victims of non-racial discrimination who chose to stay on the
job; back pay, reinstatement, or hiring provided meager relief for
those employees.6" Moreover, equitable relief failed to redress
injuries to professional standing or reputation resulting from
intentional discrimination.62
Finally, given the persistence of workplace discrimination,63
expanded liability was necessary to compel employers to abandon
such practices.' In drafting Title VII, "Congress made the critical
but erroneous assumption that there would be sufficient respect for
the law that employers.., would come into compliance as soon as
their wrongs were pointed out to them."'  Congress "emphasized
conciliation over confrontation" and empowered the courts to issue
272 (9th Cir. 1981) (following "great weight of authority" that"denies supportfor... request[s]
for emotional distress... damages under Tide VII"); DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 808
(1st Cir. 1980) (holding that Tide VII does not authorize an award of either punitive or
compensatory damages for the victim's mental anguish); see alsoVan Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp.,
368 F. Supp. 829, 835-38 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (reviewing legislative history of Tide VII and
concluding that Congress intended only equitable remedies).
60. See, e.g., Robinson v.JacksonviIle Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1532-33 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(awarding injunctive relief and one dollar in nominal damages to victim of egregious sexual
harassment in case brought under Tide VII); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 44 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1119, 1122 (N.D. I1. 1987) (observing that although harassment had caused plaintiff
physical illness as well as "severe and debilitating depression" requiring psychiatric treatment,
court could not make victim whole nor hold employer liable for past or future medical
expenses), affd in relevant part, 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589
F. Supp. 780, 784-85 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (finding that complainant was victim of "sustained, vicious,
and brutal harassment" that was both "malevolent and outrageous" and that resulted in severe
nausea, diarrhea, vomiting, and cramping, but awarding only $2763 in back pay), aff'd in relevant
part, 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Susan M. Matthews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment:
Beyond Damages Control 3 YALE J.L. & FEM. 299, 299 (1991) (observing that prior to 1991 Act,
"sexually harassed women who succeed[ed] in Tide VII suits [were] rarely compensated for the
actual extent of the harms they suffer[ed]").
61. See Govan, supra note 44, at 57 (stating that victims of harassment who chose to stay at
theirjobs were not compensated adequately for their injuries); Matthews, supra note 60, at 299-
301 (explaining that relief to victims is inadequate in comparison to damage caused by sexual
harassment).
62. See Abrams v. Baylor College of Med., 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986). In Abrams, the
court found that the defendant hospital "intentionally excluded Jews from its beneficial and
educational rotation program." Id. at 535. Despite the fact that the defendant's discriminatory
conduct foreclosed the plaintiffi from professionally valuable clinical experience, the court could
award only back pay for the difference in salary and benefits; it could not fashion compensatory
damages to make the plaintiffs whole for the injuries to their professional standing and future
earning capacity. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 68 (1991).
63. SeeGovan, supranote 44, at 174 (reporting testimony aboutprevalence of discrimination
in workplace).
64. See id. at 57.
65. Richard T. Seymour, How to Stem the Erosion: A Practical Guide to Using the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, HuM. RTS., Summer 1992, at 12, 13.
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injunctions and redress lost wages but included no provision for
fashioning legal remedies to compensate for mental anguish or to
discourage discriminatory practices.66 The unavailability of monetary
remedies discouraged aggrieved employees from exonerating their
rights67 and foreclosed the threat of legal damages as an effective
deterrent for recalcitrant employers. 6s
2. The argument against compensatory damages
Critics of expansive legal remedies under Title VII defended the
preference in federal civil rights law for victims of racial discrimina-
tion largely on the basis of policy. 9 They argued that given the long
history of racial bigotry in American culture, racial discrimination
warranted legal remedies, whereas non-racial discrimination did
not 70
This disinclination to equalize remedies for racial and other forms
of discrimination also stemmed from employers' fear of the cost
imposed by expanded liability.7' The prospect of larger monetary
relief brought with it the collateral danger of encouraging Title VII
actions.72  Despite assurances to the contrary during the debate
preceding the passage of the 1991 Act, 3 the business community's
66. See id.; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) ("If employers
faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would have little incentive to shun practices
of dubious legality.").
67. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 70 (1991). The Committee on Education and Labor
observes:
"There is little incentive for a plaintiff to bring a Title VII suit when the best that she
can hope for is an order to her supervisor and to her employer to treat her with the
dignity she deserves and the costs of bringing her suit. One can expect that a potential
claimant will pause long before enduring the humiliation of making public the
indignities which she has suffered in private... when she is precluded from recovering
damages for her perpetrators' behavior."
Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Os Air, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 636, 643 (N.D. Ohio 1986)).
68. See Riverside v. Riveria, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986) (insisting that "the damages a plaintiff
recovers contribute significantly to the deterrence of civil rights violations in the future").
69. See Govan, supra note 44, at 56.
70. See The Civil Rights Bill, WASH. POST, June 25, 1990, at AI0 (editorial) ("Nor is it a
problem ... if racial and the other prohibited forms of discrimination are differently treated;
they are different."); see also 2 The Civil Rights Act of 1990: Joint Hearings on H.R 4000 Before the
House Comm. on Educ. and Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on theJudiciay, 101st Cong. 55-60 (1990) [hereinafterJoint Hearings] (testimony of Ralph
H. Baxter, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe).
71. See 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 70, at 683-85 (statement of Lawrence Z. Lorber, National
Association ofManufacturers and Society for Human Resource Management); Steven A. Holmes,
Critics of Rights Law Fear a Flood of Suits OverJobs, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1990, at A8.
72. See David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The CivilRights Act of 1991, C108 A.L.1-A.B.A.
251, 269 (1994) ("One widely anticipated consequence of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is an
increase in employment discrimination litigation....").
73. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 70 (1991) ("The notion that adding a damages
remedy to Tide VII will trigger an explosion of frivolous lawsuits is fanciful.").
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concerns appear to have been amply justified. Following the 1991
Act's enactment, the number of discrimination complaints filed with
the EEOC increased dramatically.74 Though the increase can be
attributed in part to a heightened awareness of sexual and other
forms of harassment in the workplace,7 5 as well as to a greater
willingness to challenge such conduct,76 the possibility remains that
the prospect of large compensatory damage awards might encourage
frivolous complaints. In light of the threat of more discrimination
suits and larger awards, opponents contended further that employers
would feel compelled to "correct" any imbalance by hiring and
promoting on the basis of quotas, not merit77
The most significant criticism of the 1991 Act concerns the
fundamental change in employment discrimination law embodied by
the expansion of legal remedies under Title VII.78 The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 emphasized employer-employee conciliation by restricting
litigation and creating the EEOC to enforce Title VII's provisions
while promoting voluntary compliance.7 9  Title VII's equitable
remedies reflected Congress' intention to combat discrimination by
encouraging fair employment policies based on individual qualifica-
tions rather than on the threat of punishment."0 In short, Congress
"wanted women and minorities on the job, not languishing in the
courts."8" Critics note that "[tlhe 1991 Act shifts the emphasis of
Title VII from conciliation with equitable remedies to litigation with
tort-like damage awards." 2 Moreover, the 1991 Act pursues a policy
74. See 232 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-7 (Dec. 2, 1992). The EEOC received 70,339
charges in fiscal year 1992, a "sharp increase" from the nearly 63,000 charges filed during the
previous fiscal year. See i. In particular, the number of sexual harassment charges increased
nearly 70%, from 3329 to 5629, between fiscal years 1991 and 1992. See 15 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) at A-5 (Jan. 26, 1993). In the first quarter of fiscal year 1993, 1608 sexual harassment
charges were filed, more than two-and-a-half times the number of charges filed in the first
quarter of fiscal year 1991. See 48 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-4 (Mar. 15, 1993).
75. See 15 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-4 (reporting that dramatic increase in sexual
harassment complaints began soon after Supreme Court confirmation hearings focused public
attention on Anita Hill's accusations of sexual harassment by Clarence Thomas).
76. See Roskiewicz, supra note 49, at 399-400.
77. See 137 CONG. REC. H3924 (daily ed. June 5, 1991).
78. See Hernicz, supra note 14, at 6 (criticizing 1991 Act as promoting "inequal treatment
as a means to achieve 'equal' opportunity").
79. See FrancisJ. Vans, Title VI: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431, 452
(1966).
80. See Roskiewicz, supra note 49, at 395 n.19.
81. The Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2104 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 101st Cong. 208 (1989) (testimony of Lawrence Z.Lorber, NationalAssociation
of Manufacturers and Society for Human Resource Management).
82. Hernicz, supra note 14, at 4; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 147 (1991)
(predicting that Title VII would be transformed from statute rightfully oriented to quick
resolution of disputes and prompt reinstatement of employee to his or her proper posi-
tion-with quick economic relief for lost wages-to litigation generating machine that benefits
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of race consciousness and individual relief rather than color blindness
and class improvement."3
3. Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
The debate over expanded remedies for employment discrimination
victims pitted a Democratically controlled Congress against a
Republican administration. 4 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1990,85 which authorized unlimited compensatory damages while
limiting punitive damages to the greater of either $150,000 or the
amount awarded as compensatory damages.86 Worried that business-
es would react to increased liability by implementing hiring practices
based on quotas, President Bush vetoed the bill."
After failing to muster the votes necessary to sustain an override,
8
Congress set out to pass a modified version of the bill early the next
session.8 9  Ultimately, Congress and the White House forged a
compromise: a bill that responded to the Supreme Court's civil rights
decisions90 and expanded legal relief for victims of workplace
only lawyers).
83. SeeJames Forman,Jr., Victoty by Surrender:. The Voting Rights Amendments of 1982 and the
CivilRightsAct of 1991, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 133, 174 (1992) (asserting that 1991 Act permits
unequal treatment to achieve "equal" opportunity).
84. See Govan, supra note 44, at 31-36 (detailing political machinations and policy debate
culminating in passage of 1991 Act).
85. Two bills comprised the 1990 anti-discrimination legislation: H.R. 4000, 101st Cong.
(1990), and S. 2104, 101st Cong. (1990).
86. SeeS. 2104 § 8(A)-(B).
87. See President's Message to the Senate Returning WithoutApproval the Civil Rights Act
of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1632 (Oct. 22, 1990) (vetoing S. 2104, in part due to
quota provisions in bill).
88. See 136 CONG. REC. S16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (reporting failure to override veto
of Civil Rights Act of 1990).
89. See 137 CONG. REC. H53 (daily ed.Jan. 3, 1991) (recording introduction of H.R. 1, 102d
Cong. (1991), and noting intent to amend Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to strengthen
existing laws prohibiting employment discrimination).
90. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (stating as one of Act's
purposes "to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court [interpreting the Civil Rights
Acts of 1866 and 1964] by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination"); see also Landgrafv. USI Film Prods.,
114 S. Ct. 1483, 1489 (1994) (identifying specific sections of 1991 Act which "were obviously
drafted with 'recent decisions of the Supreme Court' in mind") (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1991
§ 3(4)).
In addition to § 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which addresses the Court's finding in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), several sections of the Act specifically
respond to other Supreme Court decisions. For example:
[Section] 101... amended the 1866 Civil Rights Act's prohibition of racial discrimina-
tion in the "mak[ing and enforce[ment] [of] contracts".., in response to Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union; § 107 responds to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins by setting forth
standards applicable in "mixed motive" cases; § 108 responds to Martin v. Wilks by
prohibiting certain challenges to employment practices implementing consent decrees;
§ 109 responds to EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. by redefining the term 'employee'
as used in Title VII to include certain United States citizens working in foreign
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discrimination within statutory limits designed to placate employers'
fear of costly litigation.91 On November 21, 1991, President Bush
signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.92
C. Overview of the Damages Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
The damages provisions of the 1991 Act reflect the concerns raised
in the course of the political debate surrounding the issue of
expanded remedies under Title VII.93 The 1991 Act states that one
of its purposes is "to provide appropriate remedies for intentional
discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace,"94 and
makes concessions in the form of limits to and exclusions from the
availability of damages." These compromises were intended to
mollify critics who feared that the availability of unlimited compensa-
tory damages would spawn meritless litigation and prove too costly for
employers, especially smaller businesses.
96
Section 102 of the 1991 Act97 authorizes compensatory and
countries for United States employers; § 112 responds to Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,
Inc. by expanding employees' rights to challenge discriminatory seniority systems; § 113
responds to West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey by providing that an award of
attorney's fees may include expert fees; and § 114 responds to Library of Congress v.
Shaw by allowing interest on judgments against the United States.
Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1489-90 (citations and footnote omitted).
91. See President's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOc. 1701, 1702 (Nov. 25, 1991) (stating that 1991 Act "adopts a compromise under which
'caps' have been placed" on compensatory damages).
92. See id.
93. See generally Govan, supra note 44 (detailing debate over 1991 Act); Caryn Leslie Lilling,
Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Examination of the Storm Preceding the Compromise of America's
Civil Rghts, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 215 (1991) (explaining political concerns prior to adoption of
1991 Act).
94. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
95. See id. § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
96. See Govan, supra note 44, at 57-58, 103-04, 211-12 (explaining employers' concern over
expanded monetary liability under Titie VII and discussing political debate that resulted in
capping damages available under 1991 Act).
97. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a). The provision amending the
scope of remedies awardable under Titie VII reads as follows:
(1) Civil rights. In an action brought by a complaining party under [Title VIII against
a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under [Titie VII],
**. and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under under section 1981
of this title, the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages
as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
I& § 102(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1). For intentional discrimination in violation of the ADA
or Rehabilitation Act, section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides:
(2) Disability. In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers,
remedies, and procedures set forth in section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
... (as provided in section 107(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42
U.S.C. § 12117(a)), and section 794a(a) (1) of Title 29, respectively) against a
respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment
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punitive damages in cases brought under Title VII, the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 199098 ("ADA"), and the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973."9 Damages are available only to victims of unlawful inten-
tional discrimination, provided that the aggrieved party cannot
recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1981." o Damages are not recoverable in
cases alleging "disparate impact."'' In addition, damages may not
be awarded under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act when an employer
exhibited good faith efforts in accommodating an employee's
disability.10 2  Punitive damages are not recoverable against the
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact)... the complaining party may
recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this
section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, from the respondent.
Id. § 102(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (2).
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1994). Compensatory damages are not available, however, for all
violations of the Rehabilitation Act. See Lane v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2092, 2100 (1996) (barring
recovery of monetary damages for violations of section 504(a) of Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability "under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service"). Although the Court
in Lane held that Congress has not waived the federal government's sovereign immunity against
awards of monetary damages for violations of section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act, the Court
stated in dicta that "[iln the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress made perfectly plain that
compensatory damages would be available for certain violations of § 501 by the Federal
Government .... Id. at 2097. Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination
on the basis of disability in employment decisions by the federal government. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 791.
100. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)-(2).
101. See id. § 102(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1). Disparate impact and disparate treatment
constitute the two principle theories of discrimination under Tide VII. See Lilling, supra note
93, at 217. As the term connotes, disparate treatment under Title VII involves treating
individuals differently on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, or religion. See id. at 222.
The notion of discrimination via disparate impact, however, is ajudicial, rather than a statutory,
construct. Extrapolating on the individual right to be free from unlawful discrimination, the
Supreme Court recognized "group rights" through the disparate impact theory of discrimination.
See Hernicz, supra note 14, at 3. In Criggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a unanimous
Court ruled that Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431. Congress later ratified the Supreme
Court's conclusion that Title VII prohibits employment practices which have a disproportionate
adverse effect on a recognized minority even absent discriminatory intent. See Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17) (codifying Supreme Court's finding in Griggs that Title VII outlaws all
forms of employment discrimination, including practices that are not intentionally discriminato-
ry).
102. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (1994). Section
§ 102(a) (3) states:
(3) Reasonable accommodation and good faith effort. In cases where a discriminatory
practice involves the provision of a reasonable accommodation pursuant to [the ADA
or Rehabilitation Act], damages may not be awarded under this section where the
covered entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the person with the
disability who has informed the covered entity that accommodation is needed, to
identify and make a reasonable accommodation that would provide such individual
with an equally effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on the
operation of the business.
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federal government in any event. 03 When compensatory damages
are available, they may be awarded in addition to any equitable relief
authorized under Title VII. 104 The 1991 Act also caps compensatory
and, in actions brought by private sector employees, punitive
damages. 5 The limits are indexed in relation to the size of the
employer.10 6
II. THE EEOC'S RESPONSE TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
A. The Jackson Decision-Compensatory Damages Available in the
Administrative Process
The legislative history and language of the 1991 Act were silent as
to the availability of legal remedies in the administrative process.
Absent explicit congressional intent, resolution of the issue rested
with the EEOC. Nearly a year passed before the appropriate case
presented the Commission with the opportunity to answer the
question. Jackson v. United States Postal Servic °7 proved to be the
landmark case.
In Jackson, the appellant alleged reprisal and discrimination on the
bases of sex, race, age, and disability after his supervisor shadowed
him at the direction of a Postal Service official."0 ' The employee
asserted that the incident caused stress and exacerbated his pre-
existing hypertension, necessitating further medical care. 0 9  In
Id. § 102(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3).
103. See i. § 102(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1) (providing for punitive damages against a
respondent "other than a government, government agency or political subdivision").
104. See id. § 102(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2) (excluding from compensatory damages
"backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964").
105. See id. § 102(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3). Section 102(b) (3) provides:
(3) Limitations. The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this
section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of
punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining
party -
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees... $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees... $100,000;
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees ... $200,000;
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees ... $300,000.
Id 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
106. Seeid., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
107. E.E.O.C. No. 01923399, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062 (1992).
108. SeeJackson v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01923399, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062, at
XII-185 (1992).
109. See id.
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addition to a portion of his medical expenses, he sought compensa-
tion for the cost of transportation to the doctor."' The agency's
offer of full relief denied the employee's damages claim."' The
appellant refused the offer, and pursuant to EEOC regulation,"
2
the agency issued a final agency decision ("FAD") cancelling his com-
plaint for failure to accept a certified offer of full relief."3
On appeal, the EEOC considered whether the agency's offer indeed
constituted "full relief' (that is, the relief to which the appellant
would have been entitled if findings of discrimination were entered
with respect to all allegations raised in the complaint)."' Emphasiz-
ing the "make-whole" intent of Title VII's remedial scheme," 5 the
EEOC observed that relief must eliminate discriminatory employment
practices while restoring a victim to the position he would have
occupied were it not, for the employer's unlawful conduct."6
Concluding that the 1991 Act does provide compensatory damages in
the administrative process, the Commission held that the agency's
offer did not constitute full relief because it failed to address the
employee's compensatory damage claim.1'7 Accordingly, the EEOC
vacated the FAD and remanded the complaint for resolution of the
damages issue. 8
In holding that compensatory damages are available in administra-
tive proceedings for discriminatory conduct on or after the effective
date of the 1991 Act, 9 the EEOC relied on policy considerations
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(h) (1996) (formerly 29 C.F.R. § 1613.215(a)(7) (1990)).
113. See Jackson, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062, at XII-187.
114. See id. at XII-185 (citing Merriell v. Department ofTransp., E.E.O.C. No. 05890596, 90
F.E.O.R. 3034 (1989)).
115. SeeAlbemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) ("It is also the purpose of
Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination.").
116. See Jackson 93 F.E.O.R. 3062, at XII-185 (citing Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 420-21).
117. See id. at XII-187.
118. See id.
119. See id. at XII-221 n.1. At the time the Commission decided Jackson, the EEOC
interpreted the 1991 Act as inapplicable to complaints pending as of November 21, 1991 (the
effective date of the 1991 Act), or to complaints seeking damages for alleged unlawful
discrimination occurring prior to the 1991 Act's effective date. See EEOC Notice 915.002, Policy
Guidance on Application of Damages Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Charges and
Pre-Act Conduct, 1992 WL 189089, at *11 (Dec. 27, 1991). In April 1993, the EEOC commission-
ers voted to rescind the December 1991 policy guidance and subsequently issued an interim
insu-uction declaring that the 1991 Act's damage provisions were retroactive. Memorandum
from EEOC Chairman Tony E. Gallegos to James H. Troy, Director, Office of Program
Operations, and Ronnie Blumenthal, Director, Office of Federal Operations, Interim Instructions
for Office of Federal Operations-Applicability of Compensatory Damage Provision of Civil Rights Act of
1991 to Pre-Act Conduct (Oct. 5, 1993).
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and inferences drawn from the language of the statute itself.2 '
Section 102 (a) (2) of the 1991 Act explicitly refers to actions pursued
under Rehabilitation Act procedures, 12  suggesting that the term
"action" in this subsection embraces administrative proceedings. 22
Reading the statute as a whole, the Commission inferred that "action"
in section 102(a) (1)123 applied to administrative adjudications com-
menced under Title VII as well.124  Moreover, the definition of
"complaining party" includes persons who may bring "an action or
proceeding" under Title VII, the ADA, or the Rehabilitation Act, 125
further indicating that Congress resolved to afford compensatory
damages to both federal sector employees seeking relief in the
administrative process and private sector employees pursuing an
action in district court.
126
B. Jackson and Its Progeny-Analyzing Compensatory Damage Claims
in the EEOC Administrative Process
1. Jackson-evidentiary threshold for recovering compensatory damages
Besides establishing that the 1991 Act authorized compensatory
damages in administrative proceedings, the Jackson decision an-
nounced the evidentiary threshold for maintaining a compensatory
damage claim. The Commission adopted a two-pronged test: a
complainant must submit "objective evidence" that (1) she incurred
compensatory damages and (2) the damages are linked to the alleged
discrimination. 27 Provided that the appellant adduced the requisite
evidence, the agency would be required to address compensatory
damages in making its offer of full relief.
21
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Landgraf v. USIFilm Products, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1483
(1994), which held that the compensatory damages provision of the 1991 Act may not be
applied retroactively to pre-Act conduct, the Commission voted not to seek compensatory
damages for any violation pre-dating the 1991 Act. Memorandum from EEOC Chairman Tony
E. Gallegos to James H. Troy, Director, Office of Program Operations, and Ronnie Blumenthal,
Director, Office of Federal Operations, Recision of Interim Instructions on the Application of
Compensatory Damages Provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pre-Act Conduct (May 25, 1994).
120. See Jackson, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062, at XII-185 (announcing that EEOC's "conclusion is based
upon a thorough examination of the statute's language and policy considerations").
121. See supra note 97 (quoting § 102(a) (2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
122. Jackson, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062, at XII-186.
123. See supra note 97 (quoting § 102(a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
124. Jackson, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062, at XII-186.
125. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(d) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d) (1) (1994).
126. Jackson, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062, at XII-186 to XII-187.
127. See id. at XII-187.
128. See id.
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Because only pecuniary damages (that is, out-of-pocket expenses)
were at issue in Jackson, the case did not contemplate the evidentiary
problems presented by claims for intangible injuries. Given that
damages for emotional distress or pain and suffering are inherently
subjective, commentators opined that application of Jackson's strict
"objective proof" standard to assertions of nonpecuniary harm would
all but foreclose recovery of compensatory damages beyond medical
expenses. 1 29 1
2. Carle-"other evidence" of intangible injury
Shortly after Jackson, the EEOC Office of Federal Operations8 °
("OFO") considered the question of proving nonpecuniary damages
in Carle v. Department of the Navy.' In Carle, the appellant alleged
sexual harassment by a co-worker and reprisal by a supervisor who
failed to stop the harassment and later threatened to fire her because
she refused to work with the co-worker in question.132 In her
complaint, the appellant sought compensatory damages for emotional
distress. 33 The agency's offer of relief did not include damages,
and consequently, the appellant declined the offer.'34 In response,
the agency dismissed her complaint for failure to accept an offer of
full relief.135 She appealed, contending, inter alia, that the offer did
not constitute full relief because it omitted compensatory damag-
es. 136 The OFO found that the agency's offer was deficient, vacated
the FAD, and directed the agency to consider the issue of compensa-
tory damages on remand. 37
Although the OFO's ruling in Carle reaffirmed the two-pronged
analysis set forth in Jackson, it modified the evidentiary standard for
proving an entitlement to compensatory damages. No longer would
129. See Hemingway, supra note 17, at 691; see also HADLEY, supra note 21, at 977 (predicting
that EEOC's "requirements of 'objective' proof of not only damages, but a nexus between the
harm and the discriminatory action, will indeed prove difficult, if not impossible, for many
complainants to overcome").
130. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (explaining that OFO is responsible for
administering federal sector complaint process). Appellate decisions by the OFO do not have
precedential authority; only rulings by the EEOC commissioners themselves constitute true
EEOC policy. See Hemingway, supra note 17, at 690 n.7. Decisions by the OFO are instructive,
however, in that they provide guidance as to the manner in which the EEOC may resolve a
particular issue. See id.
131. E.E.O.C. No. 01922369, 94 F.E.O.R. 1043 (1993).
132. Carle v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01922369, 94 F.E.O.R. 1043, at X148
(1993).
133. See id. at XI-48 to X1-49.
134. See id. at XI-49.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at X1-50.
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the EEOC require only objective proof."3 Agencies now would be
required to examine both objective evidence and "other evidence" in
evaluating a claim for damages.139 By instructing agencies to accept
other evidence such as a complainant's personal statement detailing
her emotional distress and explaining how physical and behavioral
manifestations of the anguish affected her both on and off the
job,'40 the Commission clearly intended to accommodate nonpecu-
niary damage claims that Jackson's stringent "objective evidence"
standard effectively precluded.
3. Mims-shifting the burden of production
Absent from the analysis developed by the Commission's holdings
in Jackson and Carle was an allocation of evidentiary burdens between
the complainant and the agency in proving (and rebutting) requests
for compensatory damages.'41  The EEOC's discussion in Mims v.
Department of the Navy 42 provided this missing element.
The appellant in Mims alleged two separate incidents of sexual
harassment by her supervisor resulting in her hospitalization for
severe emotional distress. 43 As compensation for pain and suffer-
ing, she requested $300,000."' In support of her claim, the appel-
lant submitted medical bills totaling $755. 4 Without explanation
of how it derived the amount, the agency offered only $500.146
Following the appellant's rejection of the offer, the agency cancelled
her complaint.147  In declining to affirm the FAD on appeal, the
Commission indicated that, were it not for the inexplicable difference
in the expenses claimed and the amount offered, it would have
regarded the agency's offer as full relief.48  Instead, the EEOC
reinstated the complaint for further processing of the damages
claim.
49
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Hemingway, supra note 17, at 691.
142. E.E.O.C. No. 01933956, 94 F.E.O.R. 3153 (1993).
143. SeeMims v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01933956, 94 F.E.O.R. 3153, at XII-19
(1993).
144. See id.
145. See id. at XII-20.
146. See id. at XII-19.
147. See id.
148. See id. atXII-20 (stating that because "the agency calculated [the sum it offered] without
further elaboration, and provided no analysis of a connection linking the objective evidence
[the] appellant presented to the $500 figure," EEOC was unable to determine whether agency's
offer constituted full relief as to issue of compensatory damages).
149. See id.
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In evaluating the adequacy of the agency's offer, the Commission
adopted an analysis that shifted the burden of production from the
complainant to the agency.5 ' That is, once the complainant
establishes a prima facie claim to damages, the burden of production
shifts to the agency to adduce evidence refuting the request.'5 l To
satisfy the prima facie burden, a complainant must proffer objective
and other evidence sufficient to show damages and linkage to a
"reasonable certainty."'52
Because the appellant in Mims made a prima facie showing, the
agency bore the burden of demonstrating that a sum less than that
requested by the complainant constituted an offer of full relief.'
Accordingly, the agency should have substantiated its offer of $500 in
light of the appellant's evidence.M Absent such an explanation, the
Commission concluded that it could not determine whether the offer
constituted full relief.155 The consequence of Mires appears to be
that in offering a compensatory damage award less than that sought
by a complainant, an agency must itemize and justify the amount
rather than merely present a sum, or risk remand on appeal.
4. Rountree and Carpenter-factors to consider and the standard to
apply in assessing nonpecuniary damages
With the Jackson-Carle-Mims trilogy, the Commission erected the
basic framework for evaluating compensatory damages claims in the
administrative process. Yet, for more than two years followingJackson,
the Commission declined to quantify an award, remanding cases for
further investigation of damage claims' or affirming agency
dismissals of complaints for failure to adduce sufficient proof of
150. See id. (stating that once claimant establishes prima facie case of damages, burden of
production shifts to agency (citing Eureka Inv. Corp. v. Chicago Tide Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 942
(D.C. Cir. 1984))).
151. See id. (citing Eureka, 743 F.2d at 942; Barnes v. United States, 685 F.2d 66, 69 (3d Cir.
1982)).
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See, e.g., Huhn v. Department of the Treasury, E.E.O.C. No. 05940630,95 F.E.O.R 3143,
at XII-121 (1995) (vacating FAD and remanding complaint for further processing when agency
improperly dismissed complaint as moot without addressing issue of compensatory damages);
Rivera v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01934157, 94 F.E.O.R. 3522, at XII-369 (1994)
(remanding complaint for further investigation of compensatory damages issue when agency
failed to provide appellant adequate opportunity to submit documentation substantiating claim
for damages); Carlson v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 05930480, 94 F.E.O.R. 3403, at
XII-31 (1994) (remanding complaint when agency improperly dismissed complaint as moot);
Haynes v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 05920891, 94 F.E.O.R. 3168, at XII-72 (1993)
(remanding complaint because agency failed to recognize that appellant raised prima facie claim
for damages).
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damages and other reasons. 157  As a result, the question remained:
By what standard were agencies and AJs to determine a proper award?
In the summer of 1995, the EEOC provided an answer, rendering the
first decisions quantifying compensatory damage awards: Rountree v.
Department of Agriculture58 and Carpenter v. Department of Agricul-
ture. 59
a. Rountree-factors to consider in determining a "reasonable"
nonpecuniary damage award
The Rountree case concerned a discriminatory performance
appraisal."6  To remedy the discrimination, the agency agreed to
improve the appellant's rating and provide bonus pay and benefits
commensurate with the higher appraisal.' 6' The agency also agreed
to award compensatory damages, subject to the appellant's submission
of adequate proof.'62
The appellant submitted a request for $937,725 in compensatory
damages.' 3 Of the total claim, $680,000 constituted compensation
for nonpecuniary losses such as stress and various intangible inju-
ries." As evidence of his nonpecuniary damages, the appellant
submitted a sworn personal statement describing the numerous losses
he allegedly suffered as a result of the agency's discriminatory
conduct." Additional proof consisted of: (1) unsworn statements
157. See, eg., Jewett v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01943527, 95 F.E.O.R. 1065,
at XI-161 (1994) (affirming agency's determination that appellant failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove entitlement to compensatory damages); Raymer v. United States Postal Serv.,
E.E.O.C. No. 01942478, 95 F.E.O.R. 1004, at XI-13 (1994) (finding that appellant failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove damages and linkage despite opportunity to do so); Munson
v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01943006, 95 F.E.O.R. 1006, at XI-18 (1994)
(upholding agency's determination that appellant had failed to provide objective evidence of
damages or agency's responsibility for such damages); Dennis-Brown v. United States Postal
Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01930016, 95 F.E.O.R. 1008, at XI-26 (1994) (finding evidence of damages
and linkage adduced by appellant insufficient to prove entitlement to compensatory damages);
Caudle v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01930473, 94 F.E.O.R. 3163, at XII-46 (1993)
(rejecting appellant's damages claim for failure to present any proof).
158. E.E.O.C. No. 01941906, 95 F.E.O.R. 3223 (1995).
159. E.E.O.C. No. 01945652, 95 F.E.O.R. 3229 (1995).
160. See Rountree v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01941906, 95 F.E.O.R. 3223, at XII-
120 (1995).
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. (asserting nonpecuniary harm due to "stress related problems (loss of sleep,
decreased physical activity, decreased libido, weight increase, argumentative behavior with co-
workers, adverse side effects of anti-depressant medication, and verbal and physical abuse of
wife), ... loss of consortium .... loss of educational opportunities for his child, ... loss of
enjoyment of life .... damage to his reputation at work, and... damage to his reputation in
community and personal life").
165. See id. at XII-120 to XII-121.
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from five co-workers describing the appellant's distress over his EEO
complaint and the deterioration of his relationships at work; (2) an
unsworn statement from the appellant's wife corroborating his
representation of an ailing family life; and (3) a letter from a clinical
psychologist diagnosing his depression and recommending anti-
depressant medication. 66
After reviewing the appellant's proof, the agency issued its FAD
denying his request for compensatory damages. 67 On appeal, the
Commission reversed the FAD with regard to the agency's rejection
of the nonpecuniary damage claim, awarding the appellant
$8,000.' 68
At the outset of its analysis of the appellant's claims, the Commis-
sion reiterated that in order to receive a compensatory damage award,
an appellant must establish: (1) that the agency's discriminatory
action directly or proximately resulted in the harm; (2) the nature
and degree of the harm; and (3) the duration or anticipated duration
of the harm. 69 Assuming the appellant makes a prima facie show-
ing, the Commission observed, an award must be limited to the sum
necessary to reimburse an appellant for the actual losses, even if
intangible, caused by the agency's discriminatory conduct.170
The Commission ruled that the appellant's emotional distress and
resultant symptoms stemmed in large measure from the stress of
pursuing the EEO complaint and from alleged reprisal by agency
officials after he initiated the complaint.'7 Because compensatory
damages are not available for intangible injuries resulting from
participation in the EEO process172 and the allegations of reprisal
were not at issue in the instant complaint,17 the extent of emotion-
al distress attributable to those factors was not compensable. 7'
The EEOC also denied the appellant's request for damages
resulting from injury to his relationships with co-workers, with his
166. See id.
167. See id. at XII-122.
168. See id. at XII-124.
169. See id. at XII-122 (citing Rivera v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01934157, 94
F.E.O.R. 3522 (1994); EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 22, at *5).
170. See id. at XII-123 (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 22, at *7).
171. See id.
172. See id. (citing Appleby v. Department of the Army, E.E.O.C. No. 01933897, 95 F.E.O.R.
3017 (1994)); see also infra notes 271-89 and accompanying text (discussing unavailability of
compensatory damages for emotional distress stemming from participation in EEO complaint
process).
173. See Rountree, 95 F.E.O.R 3223, atXII-126 nA (explaining that complainant could obtain
compensatory damages for nonpecuniary harm, if any, resulting from alleged reprisal only if he
prevailed in his separate reprisal EEO complaint).
174. See id. at XII-123 to XII-124.
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family, and with the community for failure to adduce evidence of
linkage sufficient to establish a causal nexus between the agency's
action and the alleged harm." In rejecting the appellant's asser-
tion that the discriminatory performance appraisal and denial of
bonus pay caused him to verbally and physically abuse his wife and
child, the EEOC relied on the psychologist's diagnosis that excluded
violent or abusive behavior as a symptom of his depression. 7 6
Generalized distrust of and hostility toward whites likewise are not
symptomatic of dysthymia 7 7  Consequently, the EEOC dismissed
the appellant's contention that his distress over the discrimination
caused him to assault a white department store manager, thereby
harming his reputation in the community.78
Public policy concerns also motivated the Commission's ruling.
Because a monetary award would contravene the public interest in
preventing violence, the EEOC declared it would not grant damages
for the appellant's violent outbursts even if he could establish a causal
nexus between the agency's conduct and his behavior. 1
7
In addition, the Commission determined that the appellant failed
to prove he was entitled to compensatory damages for the loss of
educational opportunities for his son, as the evidence demonstrated
that his wife's loss of her job, not the agency's unlawful conduct,
prevented the appellant from sending his child to private school. 18 6
The EEOC did find, however, that some of the appellant's
emotional distress was due to the agency's discriminatory treat-
ment.' The appellant's affidavit indicated his sleeplessness began
soon after he learned of the appraisal, whereas his additional mental
distress and depression began upon realizing he would be denied
bonus pay due to the low rating.'82 Furthermore, although the
psychologist's letter did not identify a cause of the appellant's
175. See id. at XII-120.
176. See id. at XII-124 to XII-125. The psychologist diagnosed the complainant's condition
as dysthymia in accordance with the revised third edition of the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of MentalDisorders ("DSM'). See id. at XII-121. The
DSM is the "diagnostic bible of the mental health professions" and as of 1994, is in its fourth
edition. MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES, supra note 50, at xxxvi & n.4. As the EEOC
observed, according to the DSM, a diagnosis of dysthymia requires a depressed mood for more
days than not, with at least two additional symptoms such as insomnia and low self-esteem, and
with no evidence of a major depressive episode. See Rountree 95 F.E.O.R. 3223, at XII-121; see
also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 349 (4th ed. 1994) (listing diagnostic criteria for dysthymia).
177. See Rountree, 95 F.E.O.R. 3223, at XII-124.
178. See id.
179. See id. at XII-125.
180. See id.
181. See id. at XII-123.
182. See id.
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depression, it confirmed that the appellant was "very tense" and
preoccupied with thoughts of the incidents at work leading to his
complaint. 
1 3
Having concluded that the appellant had proved that the agency's
discrimination caused a portion of his mental distress, the EEOC set
out to determine an appropriate award." To that end, the Com-
mission identified the following factors to consider in assessing a
claim:
[W]e first look to the nature and severity of appellant's emotion-
al distress and related symptoms. We consider fairly recent jury and
court awards in cases in which the harm to the plaintiff was similar
in nature and severity to appellant's emotional distress and related
symptoms. We also consider the duration and expected duration
of appellant's emotional distress and related symptoms. We
consider the extent to which appellant's emotional distress and
related symptoms were caused by factors other than the discrimina-
tory act of the agency. Finally, after considering all of these factors,
we decide a reasonable dollar value to compensate appellant for
that portion of his emotional distress and related symptoms that
were caused by the agency's discrimination. 85
Addressing each of these factors in turn, the EEOC first reiterated
the host of stress-related problems averred by the appellant in his
affidavit. 186  Yet, contrary to the appellant's representation of the
depression as severe, the psychologist's diagnosis of dysthymia did not
indicate that the appellant suffered a major depressive episode.'
A review of cases granting damages for injuries similar in nature and
severity disclosed awards ranging from $500 to $100,000.'"
183. See id.
184. See id. at XII-123 to XII-124.
185. Id. at XII-123 (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 22, at *5-8 & n.13).
186. See id.; see also supra note 164 (listing nonpecuniary damages alleged by appellant).
187. See Rountree 95 F.E.O.R. 3223, at XII-123.
188. See id. at XII-123 to XII-124 (awarding $40,000 for embarrassment, humiliation, severe
headaches, sleeplessness, and depression in wrongful termination case (citing Fleming v. County
of Kane, 898 F.2d 553, 562 (7th Cir. 1990); Wulfv. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 874-75 (10th
Cir. 1989) (limiting damages for anger, depression, anxiety, frustration, and emotional strain
following wrongful discharge to no more than $50,000);Jackson v. Pool Mortgage Co., 868 F.2d
1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 1989) (affirming $24,421 compensatory damage award for depression,
muscle spasms, stomach pain, and hair loss in discriminatory discharge case); McClam v. City
of Norfolk Police Dep't, 877 F. Supp. 277, 284 (E.D. Va. 1995) (finding $15,000 proper
compensation for 18 months of headaches, lowered self-esteem, and harm to attitude and
devotion toward job resulting from repeated denials ofjob transfer requests); Kuntz v. City of
New Haven, 3 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1590, 1592 (D. Conn.) (granting $500 in compensatory damages
for disappointment, embarrassment, and sleeplessness stemming from denial of promotion),
afl'd without opinion, 29 F.3d 622 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 667 (1994); Boyce v. Board of
Comm'rs, 857 F. Supp. 794,796 (D. Kan. 1994) (awarding $50,000 for emotional pain, suffering,
and mental anguish suffered due to hostile work environment); Wilson v. Shannon, 857 F.
Supp. 34, 37 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (granting $100,000 in compensatory damages for mental anguish
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Having determined the outer limits of awards warranted under the
facts of the complaint, the EEOC next considered the duration of the
appellant's mental anguish and depression."9 The agency notified
the appellant that it would raise his performance appraisal and
provide the commensurate bonus pay nearly one year after his
sleeplessness began and nine months after the onset of his other
symptoms. 9' The appellant failed present evidence indicating any
emotional distress attributable to the discrimination persisted beyond
the date he learned of the agency's decision.'9 '
Examining the extent to which the discriminatory treatment caused
the appellant's mental anguish, the Commission looked to his
personal statement describing his distress stemming from the low
rating, including his concerns that the appraisal would eliminate him
from consideration for a supervisory position he desired.'92 More-
over, the Commission found that the resultant denial of bonus pay
during the holiday season contributed to his loss of self-esteem.
However, the EEOC noted that the fact that the appellant requested
significantly more sick leave after initiating his complaint evidenced
the degree to which the stress of the EEO process, and not the
discrimination itself, contributed to his anguish. 94 Based on the
foregoing considerations, the Commission concluded that $8000 in
compensatory damages constituted a "reasonable" award for the
appellant's proven nonpecuniary loss.'95
b. Carpenter-standard to apply in evaluating the "reasonableness"
of a nonpecuniary damage award
Although the EEOC's discussion in Rountree set forth the variables
to be included in the calculus of compensatory damages, the analysis
failed to complete the equation, as it lacked a formula by which the
reasonableness of an award could be evaluated. Within days of the
Rountree ruling, the Commission decided Carpenter v. Department of
caused by reprisal after filing discrimination complaint);Johnson v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 709
F. Supp. 98, 104 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (awarding $10,000 for mental anguish resulting from discrimi-
natory denial of promotion))).
189. See Rountree, 95 F.E.O.R. 3223, at XII-124.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. (observing that appellant experienced "feelings of inadequacy, embarrassment,
and failure").
194. See id. The Commission also found that the appellant's statements to co-workers and
to his psychologist showed that the EEO process was a great cause of his stress. See i&
195. See id.
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Agricultur 96 and in so doing, refined the reasonableness standard
articulated in Rountree.
In Carpenter, the appellant alleged reprisal and discrimination based
on age and disability through poor working conditions and unfair
assignments. 197  Under the terms of a settlement agreement, the
agency agreed to pay proven compensable damages up to
$150,000.198 Despite the extensive objective and other evidence
submitted by the appellant in support of his claim for $150,000,"'1
the agency denied the appellant's request for nonpecuniary damages
while offering only $544.02 in past pecuniary losses.2°° On appeal,
the Commission thoroughly reviewed the evidence adduced by the
appellant and found that the record supported his claim for nonpecu-
niary damages.20' Accordingly, it awarded $75,000 as compensation
for a litany of intangible injuries. °2
In determining an adequate award for the appellant's nonpecuniary
harm, the Commission addressed the factors identified in Rountree.
The appellant submitted a lengthy personal statement describing the
nature and severity of his deteriorating health and attendant mental
anguish.0 3 An affidavit from his wife corroborated his representa-
tions, detailing the appellant's diminished libido, his withdrawal from
their children, and his other stress-related ailments such as rashes,
gastrointestinal distress, sleeplessness, and headaches. 2°4 Statements
from several health care providers diagnosed "moderately severe"
physical and emotional disorders, including chronic bronchial asthma,
hypertension, and manic depression.05
196. E.E.O.C. No. 01945652, 95 F.E.O.R. 3229 (1995).
197. See Carpenter v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01945652,95 F.E.O.R. 3229, at XII-
143 (1995).
198. See id.
199. The appellant offered a 50-page, unsworn statement and a brief sworn declaration as
evidence of his injury and linkage. See id. at XII-145. In addition to an affidavit from his wife,
the appellant adduced medical records and statements from two physicians and a psychiatrist
extensively corroborating his pain and distress and their connection to the agency's actions. See
id. at XII-145 to XII-146.
200. See id. at XII-143.
201. See id. at XII-145 to XII-147.
202. See id. at XII-146 (awarding compensatory damages for nonpecuniary losses "attendant
to embarrassment, humiliation, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, loss
of health, lose [sic] of consortium, and for losses associated with other disruptions of his marital
and family relationships").
203. See id. at XII-145 (relating numerous injuries averred by appellant in his affidavit). The
appellant asserted that the agency's discriminatory conduct caused "irreparable harm to [his]
emotional health"; that his "family, friend, and work relationships began to deteriorate"; that
he experienced "long periods of anger and self pity" and "feelings of helpless and embarrass-
ment"; and that he suffered a host of physical problems, including "internal bleeding,
hemorrhoids, and severe pain." Id
204. See id. at XII-145 to XII-146.
205. See id.
216
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Given the nature and severity of the appellant's intangible injuries,
the Commission considered compensatory damage awards ranging
from $35,000 to $150,000, which federal courts had deemed appropri-
ate in similar employment discrimination cases.2" 6  Unlike in
Rountree, in which the EEOC looked only to case law for the possible
range of awards, in Carpenter the Commission also considered the
maximum award the appellant could (and, not surprisingly, did)
claim under the terms of the settlement agreement.
20 7
Turning to the duration of the appellant's distress, the EEOC
observed that even though the alleged discrimination began before
the effective date of the 1991 Act and continued after November 21,
1991, the appellant could seek compensation only for harm incurred
as a result of the agency's post-Act conduct °.20  The Commission
noted that evidence of pre-Act misconduct and injury was relevant,
however, because an agency liable for discrimination post-dating the
1991 Act is liable for the ensuing damages, even if the agency's pre-
Act conduct emotionally weakened the complainant and thereby
amplified the post-Act injury.209 As the evidence in Carpenter indicat-
ed, the appellant's physical and emotional distress began soon after
the agency assigned the appellant to work in a log lodge in June
1988.210 In November 1991, the agency required him to work in the
206. See id. at XII-147 (citing Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1335 (6th Cir.
1994) (upholding $85,000 award in age discrimination and termination case); Kientzy v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 990 F.2d 1051,1062 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming compensatory damage
award of $150,000 in sex discrimination and termination case); Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro.
Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 211 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding $150,000 award in wrongful
discharge and age discrimination case); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 205 (1st
Cir. 1987) (awarding $123,000 for emotional distress); Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135,
1146 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming $150,000 damage award for nonpecuniary loss); Turic v.
Holland Hospitality House, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 544,557-58 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (awarding $50,000
in case involving sex and religion discrimination and termination), affd in part and rev'd in part,
85 F.3d 1211, 1216 (6th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. AIO Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571, 575
(N.D. Il1. 1993) (holding $50,000 in compensatory damages appropriate in discrimination and
termination case), affd in part and rev'd in part, 55 F.3d 1276, 1286 (7th Cir. 1995); Lussier v.
Runyon, 3 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 223, 232 (D. Me. 1993) (affirming $75,000 award for injury to
mental health); McAdams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1489, 1494 (D. Minn.
1993) (awarding $35,000 in failure to accommodate case), rev'd, 30 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir.
1994)).
207. See id.
208. See id. at XII-146; see also supra note 119 (discussing non-retroactivity of 1991 Act).
209. See Carpenter, 95 F.E.O.tL 3229, at XII-143 to XII-144 (citing Harley v. Store Kraft Mfg.,
Co., 859 F. Supp. 1257, 1259-60 (D. Neb. 1994)); see also Adesanya v. United States Postal Serv.,
E.E.O.C. No. 04950026,96 F.E.O.R. 3096, atXII-316 (1996) ("[I]f an agency is liable forpost-Act
conduct, it is responsible for the damages that result from that conduct, even if the complainant
was already emotionally weakened by its pre-Act conduct and the post-Act injury is greater as a
result.").
210. See Carpenter, 95 F.E.O.R. 3229, at XII-145 (noting that appellant informed supervisors
of his breathing difficulties). The lodge to which the U.S.D.A. assigned appellant was "marked
by insect damage and infestation, rotted wood, fungus, and molds." Id. at XII-142.
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lodge periodically, and a year later the agency moved the appellant
to a windowless office."' The agency's actions during the post-Act
period exacerbated the appellant's asthma, thereby adding to his
stress and attendant physical and psychological problems."' Of the
nearly seven years of emotional distress and physical suffering
experienced by the appellant, therefore, only the last three constitut-
ed the duration of compensable harm.
2 13
As for the causal nexus between the agency's action and the
appellant's injury, the conclusions of the appellant's health care
providers buttressed his assertions that poor working conditions and
harassment induced his physical and'emotional distress.214 A
physician certified by the American Board of Allergy and Immunology
opined that the high levels of allergens in the appellant's office space
coupled with inadequate ventilation exacerbated the appellant's
respiratory condition,21 while a second doctor observed that the
appellant's work environment caused mental distress and associated
symptoms. 2 16 For its part, the agency failed to proffer any evidence
that factors other than the complaint activity caused the appellant's
intangible injuries.217
With the above factors in mind, the Commission tumed to the task
of quantifying an award. Recognizing the difficulty of calculating an
award for intangible injury,21s the EEOC adopted a correspondingly
indeterminate standard. A "proper award," it declared, must satisfy
two criteria: (1) the award must not be "'monstrously excessive'
standing alone," and (2) the sum must be "consistent with similar
awards made in similar cases."219 Given that the parties had agreed
that the appellant could claim no more than $150,000 in compensato-
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at XII-147 (noting that "much of the damages about which appellant complains
occurred in the pre-Act period").
214. See id. at XII-145 to XII-146.
215. See id. at XII-145.
216. See id. at XII-146 (quoting doctor's findings that appellant's situation at work "'had
created a high pressure and high tension office life initiating ... emotional, behavioral and
mood changes culminating in psychiatric disorder and numerous somatic complaints'").
217. See id. at XII-146.
218. See id. at XII-147 (observing that "damage awards for emotional harm are difficult to
determine and that there are no definitive rules governing the amount to be awarded in given
cases").
219. Id. (quoting Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989)). In a
subsequent case, the EEOC elaborated on the Carpentercriteria. SeeWallis v. United States Postal
Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01950510,96 F.E.O.R. 3044, at XII-153 (1995) ("The Commission notes that
for a proper award of nonpecuniary damages, the amount of the award should not be
.monstrously excessive' standing alone, should not be the product of passion or prejudice, and
should be consistent with the amount awarded in similar cases.") (citations omitted).
ASSESSING NONPECUNARY DAMAGES
ry damages, and the fact that "much" of the harm occurred prior to
the effective date of the 1991 Act, the EEOC concluded that an award
of half of the appellant's request for $150,000 properly compensated
the appellant.220
Commentators have noted the apparent incongruity of the
"monstrously excessive" language of Carpenter and the reference to
reasonableness in Rountree.21 Read separately, the decisions seem
to send mixed signals that might prompt appellants to seize on the
"monstrously excessive" standard to justify larger claims as agencies
resort to the reasonableness language to mitigate awards.222
It is unlikely, though, that the decisions were intended to stand
independently. With the second ruling following so closely on the
heels of the first, it seems more probable that the EEOC sought to
incorporate the criteria enunciated in Carpenter within the reason-
ableness standard established in Rountree. Except for the additional
criteria in Carpenter, the analysis employed by the EEOC in both cases
is largely the same. The absence in Carpenter of specific reference to
Rountree's reasonable standard suggests that the Commission intended
to clarify it's discussion in Rountree rather than to create a new
standard. To that end, the EEOC supplanted Rountree's "reasonable-
ness" language with a fuller discussion in Carpenter of the criteria by
which to determine the adequacy of an award.223
Therefore, taken together, Rountree and Carpenter provide the
previously missing guidance for applying the basic analytical frame-
work to address administrative compensatory damage claims. As
discussed below, numerous other EEOC decisions have refined
further the precepts enunciated in Jackson and its progeny in response
to other issues arising in the course of assessing compensatory
damages for intangible injury.224
220. See Carpenter, 95 F.E.O.P. 3229, at XII-147.
221. See Charles W. Hemingway, First Decisions Quantifying Compensatory Damage Awards Issued
by EEOC [Perspective] F.E.O.R. V-95-61, at V-95-63 (Sept. 13, 1995) ("The Commission's
'monstrously excessive' language [in Carpenter] appears to create potential for confusion when
contrasted with its language in Rountree that an award should be 'reasonable' to compensate a
complainant for the harm done.").
222. See id.
223. See Carpenter, 95 F.E.O.R. 3229, at XII-147 (articulating criteria by which to measure
appropriate award for pecuniary losses).
224. See infra Part II.C (reviewing cases after Jackson that addressed issues concerning
compensatory damage claims).
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C. Further Development of the EEOC Analytical Framework-Other Issues
in the Evaluation of Claims for Nonpecuniary Damages
1. Eligibility to request compensatory damages
As the 1991 Act states, victims of unlawful intentional discrimination
are entitled to seek compensatory damages, provided that the
aggrieved parties cannot recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.2 Appar-
ently, Congress intended the "cannot recover" language to resolve any
ambiguity arising from the overlap between § 1981 and Title VII (as
amended by § 1981a) in cases concerning racial discrimination; yet,
the issue still engenders some confusion.225 The question arose
whether, by virtue of § 1981a, victims of racial discrimination were no
longer permitted to seek damages under Title VII and instead had to
recover under § 1981.21 The Sponsors' Interpretative Memoran-
dum 228 explains that the "cannot recover" language is intended to
preclude duplicative recovery against a respondent under both § 1981
and § 1981a when, for instance, an African-American woman seeks
double recovery for the same harm resulting from racial discrimina-
tion (actionable under § 1981) and sex discrimination (actionable
under Title VII).229 Such an individual would be eligible to seek
damages under each of the statutes, however, if the racial discrimina-
tion caused injury "demonstrably different" from that incurred as a
result of the sex discrimination.21 Furthermore, a complaining
party need not first prove a § 1981 cause of action does not lie in
order to recover under § 1981a,23' nor must he elect one remedy to
the preclusion of the other.23 2 Thus, if a party may bring a cause
of action under § 1981, yet opts not to do so, he "cannot recover"
under § 1981 for purposes of pursuing compensatory damages under
225. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
226. See Hernicz, supra note 14, at 66 ("Less clear is the degree of overlap between 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 damages and [the 1991 Act]."); Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
EEOC Enforcement, 23 STETSON L. REv. 53, 62 (1993) (noting that "cannot recover" language "is
not free of ambiguity").
227. See Livingston, supra note 226, at 62-63 (discussing differing interpretations of "cannot
recover" requirement).
228. 137 CONG. REc. S15,484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See 137 CONG. REC. H9527 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("No
party is under any obligation to proceed under one or the other statute or to waive any cause
of action under either statute as a condition of proceeding.").
220
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§ 1981a."88 The same result might follow even if the party seeks
damages under § 1981 and Title VII simultaneously (provided, of
course, that double damages are not awarded for the same harm
incurred as a result of the discrimination)."
Under this reading, which the EEOC adopted, a party "cannot
recover" damages under § 1981 until such time as § 1981 relief is
actually awarded."' Charging that this interpretation impugns the
plain language of the statute, at least one critic has opined that the
more likely meaning of the "cannot recover" stipulation is that
compensatory damages for Title VII violations are available under
§ 1981a only when no § 1981 action lies.28 'The Commission's
stance thus permits double recovery for "multiple discrimination [e.g.,
disparate treatment on the grounds of both race and sex] based on
the same acts" where a plaintiff sues under § 1981, and Title VII.2 7
However, such criticism ignores the sponsors' clear intent to permit
recovery for multiple discrimination under both statutes only if the
plaintiff can demonstrate that each form of discrimination injured
him in a different manner.2" As a practical matter, differentiating
between harms allegedly inflicted by a combination of, for instance,
racial and national origin discrimination would be a difficult
proposition. Furthermore, when a plaintiff may sue under both
statutes, she is much more likely to bring a § 1981 action because,
unlike Title VII relief under § 1981a, there is no limit on recov-
ery."9 In the context of the administrative process, it is conceivable
that a federal employee injured by multiple discrimination could
pursue concurrently a § 1981 court action and a Title VII administra-
tive complaint. 4" As in the case of a private sector plaintiff, though,
233. See id. (statement of Rep. Edwards) (asserting that "if a party has a potential cause of
action under [§ 1981], but for whatever reason does not bring it, the party 'cannot recover
under [§ 1981]'" and is therefore eligible to recover under § 1981a).
234. See 137 CONG. REC. H9526 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (recognizing possibility thatTitle VII
and § 1981 damages actions can be brought concurrently as long as duplicative recovery is not
awarded).
235. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 22, at *2 (announcing that"the Commission
will seek damages where otherwise appropriate, even if the complaining party has an ongoing
§ 1981 court action, as long as the complaining party has not recovered under § 1981").
236. See Hernicz, supra note 14, at 66 (noting lack of language prohibiting double recovery
in statute); see also Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 72, at 274 (arguing that because sponsors'
interpretation of "cannot recover" language is not "obvious" from statutory language, courts may
interpret "cannot recover" to mean damages are not available under § 1981a if plaintiff has
potential cause of action under § 1981).
237. See Hernicz, supra note 14, at 66.
238. See supra text accompanying note 229 (quoting Sponsors' Interpretative Memorandum).
239. See Hernicz, supra note 14, at 66.
240. See Swicker v. William Armstrong & Sons, 484 F. Supp. 762, 770 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(holding that federal sector employees need not exhaust administrative remedies prior to
bringing § 1981 action).
19961
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:189
such a situation is improbable. A federal employee undaunted by the
time and expense of litigation will file suit under § 1981 motivated by
the prospect of unlimited compensatory damages, whereas one less
willing or unable to litigate will exhaust the administrative process
before considering federal district court as a last resort.241 Thus,
critics' fears that the EEOC's interpretation of the "cannot recover"
provision will result in double recovery are unlikely to materialize in
practice.
Aside from the "cannot recover" requirement for Title VII damage
claims, the 1991 Act also limits a complainant's eligibility to recover
damages for discrimination on the basis of disability.242 The 1991
Act entitles complainants to compensatory damages under the ADA
and Rehabilitation Acts except in cases when the agency exhibits
"good faith efforts" to reasonably accommodate the employee's
disability.
243
The 1991 Act, however, makes no mention of the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment ActF' ("ADEA"). The EEOC ruled on the
question whether an ADEA complainant is eligible to recover
compensatory damages in Taylor v. Department of the Army.245  In
Taylor, the appellant alleged that discrimination on the bases of age,
disability, and reprisal motivated his non-selection for an engineer
position.2" Although the agency did not find discrimination based
on disability or reprisal, it did admit age discrimination. 47 In its
FAD, the agency refused to award attorney's fees, contending that the
ADEA does not provide such an award at the administrative level.248
The EEOC OFO also denied the appellant's claim for legal fees.249
In his request for reconsideration by the Commission, the appellant
asserted for the first time that the agency's offer did not constitute
full relief because it did not include a compensatory damage
award.25 ° Given the absence of "express Congressional intent" to
apply the damages provisions of the 1991 Act to ADEA claims, the
241. See 29 C.F.Rt § 1614.408 (1996) (providing that federal sector complainant may file suit
under Title VII 120 days after instigating complaint or 90 days after final disposition of
complaint).
242. See supra note 97 (quoting 1991 Act's damages provisions for disability discrimination).
243. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (3) (1994).
244. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-634 (1994).
245. E.E.O.C. No. 05930633, 94 F.E.O.R. 3252, at XII-262 (1994).
246. SeeTaylor v. Department of the Army, E.E.O.C. No. 05930633,94 F.E.O.R. 3252, at XII-
263 (1994).
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
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EEOC held that compensatory damages are not available under the
ADEA.251 It should be noted, however, that where a complainant
prevails under the ADEA in conjunction with an allegation of
discrimination under Title VII, compensatory damages are recoverable
as to the latter.252
2. Nonpecuniary damages that are and are not compensable
In addition to delineating eligibility requirements for asserting a
damages claim, the 1991 Act indicates the nature of nonpecuniary
losses for which compensatory damages are recoverable.25 Commis-
sion decisions have adopted the language of the 1991 Act's compensa-
tory damages provision while recognizing other forms of compensable
intangible injuries. In Rountree v. Department of Agriculture,24 for
example, the Commission observed that nonpecuniary losses
compensable in the administrative process include "emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
injury to professional standing, injury to character and reputation,
injury to credit standing, and loss of health," provided, of course, that
the damages stem from post-Act discrimination. 255  In Carpenter v.
Department of Agriculture,256 the Commission awarded damages to
compensate for embarrassment, humiliation, loss of consortium, and
251. See id. at XII-264.
252. See, eg., Sowell v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01945237, 1995 WL 560207,
at *2-3 (Sept. 14, 1995) (holding that agency properly dismissed ADEA claim as moot because
age discrimination did not raise issue of compensatory damages, but finding that race and
national origin discrimination allegations were not moot because of unresolved compensatory
damages issue); Glover v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01930696, 94 F.E.O.R. 3176,
at XII-89 n.1, XII-90 (1993) (reinstating complaint alleging race, sex, and age discrimination for
further processing of compensatory damages claim because although compensatory damages are
unavailable as to ADEA claim, such damages remained possible under Title VII claims).
253. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (1994) (including
"emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses" within gamut of available compensatory damages).
The nonpecuniary losses recoverable under the 1991 Act are those traditionally included
within the definition of compensatory damages at law. The notion of compensatory damages
denotes "all loss recoverable as a matter of right and includes all damages (beyond nominal
damages) other than punitive or exemplary damages." 22 Am. JUR. 2D Damages § 23, at 50
(1988). Generally, compensatory damages include "any proximate consequences which can be
established with requisite certainty, including damages for future or prospective injuries that are
reasonably certain to result, but not for any consequences which are remote and indirect or
which are merely speculative and cannot be established with any degree of certainty." Id. at 56.
In particular, "consequences" compensated in this manner include nonpecuniary harm such as
"bodily pain and suffering,... disabilities or loss of health, injury to character and reputation,
and.. wounded feelings and mental anguish." Id. (foomotes omitted).
254. E.E.O.C. No. 01941906, 95 F.E.O.R. 3223, at XII-119 (1995).
255. Rountree v. Department of Agric., 95 F.E.O.R. 3223, at XII-122 (1995) (citing EEOC
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 22, at *5); see also supra note 119 (discussing non-retroactivity
of 1991 Act).
256. E.E.O.C. No. 01945652, 95 F.E.O.R. 3229 at XII-142 (1995).
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harm to the complainant's marital and family relationships 57 The
EEOC also considered the appellant's request for compensation based
on injury to relationships with co-workers and friends, although it
ultimately concluded that the evidence did not warrant damages on
those grounds.2" On another occasion, the EEOC entertained a
compensatory damages claim for diminished enthusiasm and self-
esteem.5 9
With regard to compensatory damage requests for loss of opportu-
nity and damage to career, the Commission has expressed some
doubt as to the viability of such claims. It examined the issue in
Browne v. Department of Agriculture. i In that case, the appellant
contended that the agency discriminated against her on the bases of
race and age in denying promotion opportunities. 6' Under the
terms of a settlement agreement, the agency agreed to pay proven
compensatory damages. 2 The appellant submitted a claim for
$57,255, $10,000 of which she attributed to compensatory damages
attendant to lost opportunities and harm to her career.263 Thereaf-
ter, the agency issued its FAD denying her claim.2 1 In affirming the
agency's determination on appeal, the EEOC found the appellant's
request for damages based on loss of opportunity and injury to her
career "too speculative" due to the many variables unrelated to the
agency's action that affect the nature of her opportunities and the
course of her career.2  It is important to note that in reaching its
decision, the EEOC emphasized the paucity of evidence substantiating
the appellant's request.2' Had she identified a specific opportunity
lost due to her nonpromotion, the Commission implied that she
257. SeeCarpenter v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01945652, 95 F.E.O.R. 3229, at XII-
146 (1995) (disagreeing with agency's finding denying appellant compensatory damages).
258. See id. at XII-146 n.3.
259. SeeFeris v. Environmental Protection Agency, E.E.O.C. No. 01934828, 1995 WL 481169,
at *17 (Aug. 10, 1995) (reversing agency's determination that it had accommodated appellant's
disability reasonably and directing agency to investigate on remand appellant's assertion that "his
enthusiasm and self-esteem have been diminished through his daily struggle with agency
management over this issue during a four-year time period").
260. E.E.O.C. No. 01944256, 95 F.E.O.R. 3230, at XII-150 (1995).
261. See Browne v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01944256, 95 F.E.O.R. 3230, at XII-
150 (1995) (alleging that agency discriminated against appellant, an African American woman
over age 60, in favor of younger white male).
262. See id.
263. See id. at XII-151 (contending that non-selection for promotion resulted in lost
professional opportunities).
264. See id. at XII-150.
265. See id. at XII-152.
266. See i. (noting that complainant must provide evidence of issue at hand); infra text
accompanying notes 402-07 (discussing appellant's failure to adduce sufficient proof of damages
in Broane).
224
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might have prevailed on her claim.267 Thus, notwithstanding the
speculative nature of a damages claim for lost opportunity and
damage to career, the EEOC left open the possibility that a complain-
ant might be entitled to compensatory damages on those grounds,
provided she adduces sufficient proof of injury and linkage.
The EEOC has been much clearer in refusing to award compensa-
tory damages to a complainant's spouse for loss of consortium.
2ta
As the Commission explained in Carpenter, because the appellant's
wife was a not a party to the complaint and compensatory damages
are available under the 1991 Act only to federal sector complainants
in the administrative process, it could not compensate her for harm
allegedly caused by the agency's discriminatory treatment of her
husband.269
Nor may a complainant seek compensatory damages with regard to
losses allegedly incurred as a result of the agency's improper
processing of an EEO complaint.27 The EEOC articulated this rule
in Appleby v. Department of the Army,27 a case involving an allegation
that the agency falsified answers to interrogatory questions and
submitted a brief to an EEOC AJ containing false statements.272 In
his initial complaint, the appellant alleged that the agency discriminat-
ed on the basis of disability by not considering him for a position.
Once the agency accepted the AJ's recommended finding of discrimi-
nation on the first complaint, it dismissed his second complaint as to
the mishandling of the original action.274 The EEOC declined to
reverse the agency's decision on appeal, concluding that compensato-
ry damages were not awardable for alleged improper handling of a
267. See Browne, 95 F.E.O.R. 3230, at XII-152 (noting that appellant "failed to identify any
specific opportunity lost as a result of her non-selection or otherwise present any objective
evidence in support of her request").
268. See Carpenter v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01945652,95 F.E.O.R. 3229, at XII-
146 n.3 (1995) (denying damages to appellant's wife).
269. See id.
270. See, eg., Estate of Gerald Shipman v. Department of Transp., E.E.O.C. No. 01945720,
1995 WL 397009, at *2 n.1 (June 27, 1995) (observing that appellant was not entitled to
compensatory damages when agency allegedly acted in reprisal by failing to submit information
to Commission); Benton v. Department of Defense, E.E.O.C. No. 01951511, 1995 WL 383504,
at *2 (June 20, 1995) (denying compensatory damages when appellant asserted that agency
improperly investigated complaint); March v. Department of Health & Human Servs., E.E.O.C.
No. 01940975, 94 F.E.O.R. 1071, at XI-31 (1994) (refusing to award compensatory damages
when appellant alleged reprisal after agency impeded her ability to attend another individual's
EEO hearing by declining to approve appellant's travel request).
271. E.E.O.C. No. 01933897, 95 F.E.O.R. 3017, at XII-43 (1994).
272. See Appleby v. Department of the Army, E.E.O.C. No. 01933897, 95 F.E.O.R. 3017, at
XII-43 (1994).
273. See id. (alleging that appellant was subjected to reprisal for prior EEO activity).
274. See id.
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complaint.275 The Commission reasoned that "[s]uch damages were
not added to the EEO statutes to address how an agency litigates an
EEO complaint but rather, to address how an agency treated an
employee or applicant in an employment-related matter."276
Later, in Rountree v. Department of Agriculture, 7 the EEOC expand-
ed Appleby's prohibition against compensatory damages for nonpecuni-
ary losses allegedly incurred as a result of the improper processing of
a complaint.28 The appellant in Rountree did not contend that the
agency mishandled his complaint; rather, he asserted that as a result
of merely participating in the administrative process, he suffered stress
and related symptoms. 2 9 Citing Appleby for the proposition that
such harm was not compensable, the EEOC declined to make a
distinction between injury allegedly caused by improper processing of
a complaint and harm due to the stress of the complaint process
itself."2 Therefore, regardless of whether the complainant requests
damages on the grounds that the agency mishandled her complaint
or argues that she is entitled to damages for the stress of merely
pursuing a complaint, a complainant may not recover compensatory
damages for harms caused by participating in the EEO process.
Finally, the Commission has refused to award compensatory
damages for intangible injuries resulting from the alleged breach of
a settlement agreement. 28 1  The EEOC recently reiterated this
275. See id. at XII-44.
276. Id
277. E.E.O.C. No. 01941906, 95 F.E.O.R. 3223, at XII-119 (1995).
278. Rountree v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01941906, 95 F.E.O.R. 3223, at XII-123
(1995) (denying compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses stemming from participation
in EEO process).
279. See id.
280. See id. ("[C]ompensatory damages are not available for emotional distress and
depression caused by the stress of participating in the EEO process.").
281. See, e.g., Child v. Department of Transp., E.E.O.C. No. 01952080, 96 F.E.O.R. 3064, at
XII-221 to XII-222 (1996) (denying compensatory damages claim for "mental anguish"
purportedly caused by agency's delay in adjusting appellant's pay as stipulated by settlement
agreement); Gibbons v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01952319, 96 F.E.O.R. 3052, at
XII-189 (1995) (rejecting compensatory damages claim for "anxiety" allegedly suffered when
appellant was denied union representation in breach of settlement agreement); Carpenter v.
Department of Agric., E.E.O.C. No. 01945652, 95 F.E.O.R. 3229, at XII-144 (1995) (rejecting
appellant's claim that agency's alleged breach of settlement agreement due to failure to act
.expeditiously" and "in good faith" entitled appellant to maximum sum of compensatory
damages allowed under agreement).
In Gibbons, the EEOC noted:
Congress added compensatory damages to federal EEO statutes in order to make the
perpetrators of intentional employment discrimination liable for non-wage economic
consequences of their acts, to the extent necessary to provide full relief to victims of
discrimination. Compensatory damages are not available for allegations of breach
since such allegations do not involve a determination of whether discrimination has
occurred.
Gibbons; 96 F.E.O.R. 3052, at XII-189 (citation omitted).
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position in Berendsen v. Department of Agriculture.8 2 In Berendsen, a
husband and wife sought both reconsideration of the Commission's
refusal to reinstate their complaints and an award for compensatory
damages allegedly caused by the agency's breach of a settlement
agreement." The husband originally had complained of reprisal
with regard to his performance appraisal rating, which allegedly was
lowered as the result of his wife's complaint asserting discrimination
based on sex and national origin.2 The settlement provided, inter
alia, that the agency would assist in reassigning the appellants.2" As
the result of downsizing efforts, though, the agency was unable to find
suitable positions for the appellants within the time specified.8 6
Finding that the agency did not breach the settlement agreement, the
EEOC denied the appellants' request for reconsideration.28 7
Moreover, the Commission noted that even if the agency had
breached the agreement, the appellants would not be entitled to
compensatory damages as a result.21
3. When a complainant may request compensatory damages
Through a series of decisions, the EEOC set forth the principles
governing the timing of a compensatory damage claim. Its disposition
of Carlson v. Department of the Navt s9 established the general rule on
how late in the administrative process a claim may be raised. Carlson
involved allegations of rude treatment by supervisors and unwarranted
transfers purportedly motivated by religious discrimination. 9 °
Although she had not asserted a claim for compensatory damages, the
appellant refused to accept the agency's offer of full relief because it
did not include monetary relief.29 1 On appeal, she challenged the
agency's dismissal of her complaint for failure to accept a certified
offer of full relief on the ground that the offer did not address
compensatory damages.292 The OFO concurred with the agency,
finding that the agency's offer constituted full relief because the
282. E.E.O.C. No. 05950488, 96 F.E.O.R. 3102, at XII-338 (1996).
283. SeeBerendsenv. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 05950488,96 F.E.O.R. 3012, atXII-
339 (1996).
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id. at XII-340.
287. See id. at XII-341.
288. See i&. (stating that Commission will not consider claim for compensatory damages
raised for first time during request for reconsideration).
289. E.E.O.C. No. 05930480, 94 F.E.O.R. 3403, at XII-29 (1994).
290. See Carlson v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 05930480, 94 F.E.O.R. 3403, at XII-
29 (1994).
291. See id. at XII-30.
292. See id.
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appellant failed to assert a damage claim before receipt of the
agency's certified offer. 93 The appellant sought reconsideration
before the Commission. 2 94
Reversing the OFO, the EEOC ruled that a complainant may raise
a compensatory damage claim at any stage of the complaint process
prior to the filing of a request to reopen and reconsider.295 When
the complainant delays and raises the issue of compensatory damages
after the agency makes an offer of full relief, the agency must
withdraw its offer and request objective and other evidence of the
alleged losses and their causal links to the agency's action, perJackson
and its progeny.296 Depending on the complainant's response, the
agency may either extend a new offer of full relief addressing the
damages claim or proceed with the processing of the complaint.9
The agency, however, need not re-investigate the complaint itself.29
As the Commission noted in a later decision, a belated damages claim
cannot "breathe new life into an otherwise resolved complaint."2 9
There is an exception to the general rule precluding a complainant
from claiming compensatory damages for the first time in a request
to reconsider. Although the EEOC alluded to such an exception in
its Thorne v. Department of Educationl°° holding, it would not state the
exception clearly until its Square v. Department of Veterans Affairo'
decision.
The appellant in Thorne alleged reprisal and three incidents of
discrimination on the grounds of age and disability.302 In its FAD,
the agency dismissed all four allegations.303  The Commission
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See id. at XII-31; see also Berendsen v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 05950488, 96
F.E.O.R. 3102, at XII-341 (1996) (noting general rule that Commission will not entertain
compensatory damages claim raised for first time in request for reconsideration); Simpkins v.
United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 05940887, 96 F.E.O.R. 3021, at XII-74 (1995) (affirming
that compensatory damages claim may be raised during administrative process up to and
including appeal); Martin v. Department of Defense, E.E.O.C. No. 05940745, 95 F.E.O.RI 3248,
at XII-204 (1995) (denying claim for compensatory damages raised for first time in request for
reconsideration); Banks v. Department of the Interior, E.E.O.C. No. 05920680,94 F.E.O.R. 3327,
at XII-465 (1994) (reiterating that complainant may raise issue of compensatory damages any
time during complaint process, up to and including appeal stage, but not thereafter).
296. See Carlson 94 F.E.O.R. 3403, at X11-31.
297. See id.
298. See Simpkins, 96 F.E.O.R. 3021, at XII-74 (stating that on remand of complaint for
consideration of compensatory damages issue, agency need only investigate damages claim, not
underlying complaint).
299. Id.
300. E.E.O.C. No. 05920952, 94 F.E.O.R. 3246 (1993).
301. E.E.O.C. No. 05930910, 95 F.E.O.R. 3018 (1994).
302. SeeThome v. Department ofEduc., E.E.O.C. No. 05920952,94 F.E.O.R. 3246, at XII-250
(1993).
303. Seeid.
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vacated the agency's rejection as to three of the allegations on appeal,
while affirming the fourth on the ground that it was the subject of a
pending civil action in federal district court." Following the
appellant's retirement, the agency issued its second FAD dismissing
the remaining allegations for mootness and failure to state a
claim."°5 The OFO upheld the agency's second dismissal, prompt-
ing the appellant to request reconsideration.8  In his request, the
appellant asserted a damage claim for the first time. 07 The EEOC
refused to reopen the complaint for reconsideration, declaring that
when an agency has correctly found that allegations are "no longer
justiciable" (as the agency did in this instance), and the Commission
affirms the decision, it will not entertain a damage claim raised for
the first time in a request for reconsideration. 08
From the Commission's discussion in Thorne, it appeared that the
EEOC might entertain a compensatory damage claim raised for the
first time in a request to reconsider when an issue of the complaint
remainedjusticiable. The Commission announced that very proposi-
tion in Square. In that case, the appellant alleged race, gender, and
age discrimination and reprisal.0 9 Because the agency neglected to
address the appellant's claim for damages, she rejected the agency's
offer of full relief.3 10 In response, the agency cancelled her com-
plaint."' On appeal, the Commission concluded that the agency's
offer constituted full relief and affirmed the agency's dismissal of the
complaint. 2 In her request to reopen and reconsider, the appel-
lant argued that the agency failed to take into account her claim for
compensatory damages, which she mistakenly had presented as a
request for punitive damages in her formal complaint. 13 She did
not challenge any other element of the offer.3 4 Without addressing
the issue whether she in fact had asserted a compensatory damage
claim, the Commission reopened on its own motion the prior
determination as to the sufficiency of the other items in the agency's
304. See id.
305. See id. (finding that appellant's retirement ensured elimination of discrimination).
306. See id.
307. See id. (asserting damage claim for "medical expenses and used sick leave").
308. See id.
309. See Square v. Department of Veterans Affairs, E.E.O.C. No. 05930910,95 F.E.O.R. 3018,
at XII-45 (1994).
310. See id. at XII-46.
311. See id.
312. See id. at XH-47 to XII-48.
318. See id. at XII-46.
314. See id.
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offer.315 Finding that the agency had erred with regard to aspects
of the offer other than the issue of compensatory damages, the
Commission vacated its prior finding and reversed the agency's
decision.3 16
Although the EEOC reiterated that it generally will not consider a
claim initially raised in a request to reconsider an appellate decision,
the Commission nonetheless directed the agency to address the
complainant's compensatory damage claim on remand. 17 If the
prior decision "is found deficient on other grounds, and is being
remanded for further processing," the Commission explained, then
it is "appropriate that [the] appellant's claim for compensatory
damages be considered by the agency on remand. s3 1  In other
words, when the EEOC determines that "other 'justiciable claims'
[are] still alive," it will entertain a claim for compensatory damages
raised for the first time in a request to reopen and reconsider.3 19
4. Raising a prima facie claim for compensatory damages
As the facts of Square indicate, under some circumstances an issue
may arise as to whether a complainant actually asserted a claim for
compensatory damages . 20  The question is significant because
under the Mims 2' shifting burden of production analysis, an agency
need not presume nonpecuniary losses; only after the complainant
has raised a prima facie claim must the agency address the issue of
compensatory damages. 22
So how does a complainant establish a prima facie claim for
compensatory damages? Cases subsequent to Mims demonstrate that
the EEOC has adopted a low threshold for making such a claim.323
In Haynes v. United States Postal Service,24 for instance, the appellant
filed a formal complaint asserting racial and gender discrimination
and reprisal when a supervisor allegedly warned the appellant that
filing an EEO complaint would furnish ajustification for discharging
315. See id.
316. See id. at XII-47 to XII-48.
317. See id. at XII-47.
318. Id.
319. See Hemingway, supra note 17, at 694.
320. See supra text accompanying note 313 (noting that appellant in Square mistakenly
presented request for compensatory damages as claim for punitive damages).
321. Mims v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01933956,94 F.E.O.R. 3153 (1994).
322. See supra Part II.B.3 (outlining shifting burden of production analysis articulated in
Mims).
323. See Hemingway, supra note 17, at 692 ("[T]he Commission has made it easy for a
complainant to get a foot through the compensatory damages door.").
324. E.E.O.C. No. 05920891, 94 F.E.O.R. 3168 (1993).
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her.3" Although the appellant contended that her supervisor
"subjected her to mental [and] physical anguish," she neglected to
specifically request compensatory damages. 26 As an offer of full
relief, the agency proposed a settlement agreement that was silent as
to the issue of compensatory damages.327 She declined the offer
and appealed the agency's dismissal of her complaint.32 The EEOC
granted her request to reopen the complaint, determining that the
appellant's claim of mental and physical distress "essentially raise [d]
an issue as to whether she is entitled to compensatory damages."329
Thus, absent an examination of the compensatory damage claim
implied in her formal complaint, the offer did not constitute full
relief.3 °
Similarly, in Fiandaca v. Department of the Navy,33 the appellant did
not make an affirmative claim for compensatory damages. 32 The
appellant in Fiandaca alleged that the agency did not take appropriate
action to end sexual harassment by a co-worker.33 After the agency
determined that she failed to establish a case of sex discrimination,
she appealed.3" In reversing the agency's finding and directing the
agency to address the issue of compensatory damages on remand, the
EEOC observed that the appellant "alluded to a claim for compensa-
tory damages throughout the processing of the case," insofar as she
represented that she suffered mental anguish and a nervous break-
down as a result of the harassment. 35 Moreover, the Commission
noted that in order to establish a prima facie claim, a complainant
"need not use legal terms of art such as 'compensatory damages,' but
merely must use some [words] or phrases to put the agency on notice
that either a pecuniary or non-pecuniary loss has been incurred." '336
325. See Haynes v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 05920891, 94 F.E.O.R. 3168, at
XII-71 (1993).
326. See id. at XII-71 to XII-72.
327. See id. (restating terms of proposed settlement agreement).
328. See id. at XII-71.
329. Id. at XII-72.
330. See id.
331. E.E.O.C. No. 01943264, 96 F.E.O.R. 3012 (1995).
332. See Fiandaca v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01943264, 96 F.E.O.R. 3012, at
XII-42 (1995).
333. See id.
334. See id. at XI-43.
335. See id.
336. Id at XII-43, XII-46 n.3. A complainant's request during EEO counseling for a cash
settlement of $300 was sufficient to make a claim for compensatory damages in one instance.
See Zurcher v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01945859, 95 F.E.O.RL 1176, at XI-168 to
XI-169 (1995) (reversing dismissal of complaint for mootness and remanding for further
processing because agency failed to request objective evidence of damages and linkage after
complainant requested cash settlement).
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Not every complainant satisfies the threshold for making a prima
facie claim, however. For example, in Roberson v. Department of Veterans
Affairs,"3 7 the appellant complained that her supervisor discriminat-
ed against her by insulting her with demeaning comments.s s The
appellant did not raise the issue of compensatory damages, and so the
agency's offer did not address whether she was entitled to monetary
relief."3 9 After the agency cancelled her complaint for failure to
accept a certified offer of full relief, she appealed.' The Commis-
sion affirmed the FAD, determining that the agency's offer was
acceptable.3 41  Because the record contained only an isolated
comment that she had been "hurt emotionally" by the demeaning
remarks, the appellant failed to raise a proper claim for compensatory
damages. 42 The agency, therefore, was not obligated to address the
issue in its offer of full relief.m
As the Commission's holdings in Haynes, Fiandaca, and Roberson
demonstrate, in determining whether a complainant has satisfied the
threshold for making a prima facie compensatory damages claim, the
EEOC considers the nature and relative severity of the purported
injury.' When a complainant alludes to nonpecuniary harm with
a fleeting comment, thereby suggesting that any injury suffered as a
result of the agency's misconduct was insignificant, the Commission
is unlikely to find that the complainant raised a proper claim for
compensatory damages.' When a complainant implies, either by
repeated allusions to nonpecuniary harm or by the severity of the
alleged discrimination itself, that his intangible injuries were
significant, the Commission likely will determine that the complainant
asserted a prima facie damage claim that the agency must address.6
If there is any doubt whether a claim has been raised, agencies are
337. E.E.O.C. No. 01940467, 94 F.E.O.R. 3325 (1994).
338. See Roberson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 94 F.E.O.R. 3325, at XII-457 (1994).
339. See id.
340. See id.
341. See id. at XII-458.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See Hemingway, supra note 17, at 693 (inferring that EEOC takes into account extent
of implied harm when determining whether complainant raised prima fade claim for
compensatory damages).
345. See id. (observing that in Roberson, appellant's reference to emotional distress "was seen
as an isolated, passing comment which was never mentioned again").
346. See id. (concluding that when purported harm is "more pronounced," EEOC likely'"will
use its remedial authority to reframe charges where it believes a complainant may have a
compensatory damage claim"); cf. Brown v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01941334, 94
F.E.O.R. 1048, atXI-62 (1994) (declaring that EEOC has authority to "'refrme charges and use
available materials and information to articulate lay complainant's charges"' (quoting Blue Bell
Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 357 (6tfi Cir. 1969))).
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best advised to inquire whether the complainant is seeking compensa-
tory damages before making an offer of full relief so as to avoid
remand on the issue.4 7
5. Affording a complainant an adequate opportunity to present evidence
of compensatory damages
As the foregoing discussion evidences, complainants often raise a
prima facie claim for compensatory damages without adducing
sufficient evidence for the agency to adequately assess the request.
348
In such instances, the agency must solicit evidence of harm and its
linkage to the alleged discrimination. 49 In addition to providing a
complainant an adequate opportunity to present evidence substantiat-
ing a claim, the agency must instruct a complainant as to the
evidentiary standard and criteria that he is required to meet.
35 0
Agencies that neglect to do so and thereafter determine that a
complainant failed to substantiate a claim for compensatory damages
most often find that they must re-investigate the issue of damages on
remand.351
The EEOC follows an "equitable approach" when determining
whether an agency afforded a complainant an adequate opportunity
to submit proof of damages,352 concluding in a number of cases that
347. Interview with Capt. William R. Kraus, Labor Counsel, Central Labor Law Office of the
United States Air Force Legal Services Agency, in Rosslyn, Va. (Jan. 18,1996) [hereinafter Kraus
Interuiew].
348. Seesupra notes 323-36 and accompanying text (discussing low threshold for stating prima
facie case as consisting of informal words or phrases indicative of pecuniary or nonpecuniary
loss).
349. See, eg., Munno v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01950343, 96 F.E.O.RL 1101, at
XI-248 (1995) (stating that when record does not contain evidence of compensatory damages,
complainant should be afforded opportunity to provide such evidence); Bowman v. Department
of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01953933, 96 F.E.O.R. 1050, at XI-123 (1995) (holding that when
complainant puts agency on notice of claim for compensatory damages, agency is required to
request evidence prior to issuance of offer of full relief);Jackson v. United States Postal Serv.,
E.E.O.C. No. 01923399, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062, at XII-184 (1992) (ruling that once appellant claims
compensatory damages, agency should request proof of alleged damages incurred and evidence
linking purported losses to agency's discriminatory action).
350. See Munno, 96 F.E.O.R. 1101, at XI-248 (reversing agency's decision denying
compensatory damages when agency failed to specify in settlement agreement that complainant
was required to adduce objective proof of damages and evidence establishing nexus between
alleged discrimination and purported injury).
351. See Rivera v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01934157, 94 F.E.O.R. 3522, at XII-
369 (1994) (vacating agency's dismissal of complaint for mootness and remanding complaint
for supplemental investigation of damages when agency did not provide complainant adequate
opportunity to present evidence of harm and linkage).
352. See Hemingway, supra note 17, at 696.
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the agency should have provided more time than the minimum
required by regulation.
353
In Blackshire v. Department of the Navy,31 for instance, the appellant
contended that the agency discriminated on the bases of race, age,
and sex when it required him to submit medical documentation while
he was on sick leave and later barred him from returning to work
until a physician approved his release. 5  After the appellant
rejected the agency's first offer of full relief because it did not address
compensatory damages, the agency requested proof of injury and
linkage.5 6 The appellant asked for two fifteen-day extensions of the
deadline, which the agency granted. 57 Finally, the agency issued a
second offer of frll relief and notified the appellant that if he did not
accept within thirty days, the complaint would be cancelled."' In
response, the appellant submitted a claim for $12,000 for nonpecuni-
ary losses with some medical documentation and affidavits from
himself and his wife. 59 He protested that despite making a good
faith effort to gather evidence, he had been unable to meet the
agency's deadlines because the medical records he needed had
become available only recently."6  The agency did not grant an
additional extension and subsequently determined that the appellant
failed to establish a nexus between the medical treatment and the
alleged discrimination.36' Concurring with the agency, the EEOC
found on appeal that the medical records were insufficient to prove
linkage. 62 The Commission granted the appellant's request to
reopen the complaint and remanded the issue of damages for further
processing, however, because the affidavits of the appellant and his
wife put the agency on notice that the appellant needed a "more
reasonable time" period to secure the necessary documentation to
substantiate his claim.3 63
353. See Rivera, 94 F.E.O.R. 3522, at XII-369 (directing agency to allow appellant another 30
days to submit requested evidence after first submission was delayed three days by postal service
and missed original deadline); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(g) (1996) (mandating that agency
must provide complainant 15 days to comply with request for clarification of complaint
allegation or element of relief therein).
354. E.E.O.C. No. 01932605, 94 F.E.O.R. 3321 (1994).
355. See Blackshire v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01932605, 94 F.E.O.R. 3321, at
XII-447 (1994).
356. See id.
357. See id. at XII-447 to XII-448.
358. See id. at XII-447.
359. See id. at XII-448.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. See id. at XII-448 to XII-449.
363. See id. at XII-449.
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1996] ASSESSING NONPECUNIARY DAMAGES 235
In contrast to Blackshire stands Munson v. Department of the Navy."
In that case, the appellant alleged that the agency acted against her
in reprisal for her filing of a prior EEO complaint."s The agency
instructed the appellant to specify the sum of compensatory damages
she sought and to provide objective and other evidence of the
damages incurred and the causal link between the harm and the
agency's actions."S The agency further informed the appellant that,
if necessary, she could ask for additional time to submit the evi-
dence. 67 Subsequently, the agency granted three extensions.3
More than a month after the agency's first request for evidence, the
appellant responded by claiming $300,000 in damages and describing
various pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses. 369 Several weeks later,
the agency informed the appellant that the evidence she submitted
was inadequate and provided further instruction as to the type of
proof required to establish an entitlement to compensatory damag-
es.Y°0 Additionally, it advised the appellant that she could review a
copy of the EEOC's guidance on compensatory damages in the
agency's EEO office.3 11 Another month passed before the appellant
responded to the agency's second request, this time refusing to
provide documentation of her expenses or information about her
medical treatment and medications. 2  Consequently, the agency
denied the appellant's request for compensatory damages in its offer
of full relief, which she refused to accept." After the agency issued
its FAD dismissing her complaint, she appealed. Although the
Commission reversed the FAD because the agency's offer was deficient
in other respects, it affirmed the agency's determination that the
appellant was not entitled to compensatory damages, as she failed to
364. E.E.O.C. No. 01943006, 95 F.E.O.R. 1006 (1994); see also Wolf v. United States Postal
Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01953705, 96 F.E.O.R. 1095, at XI-236 (1995) (finding that agency properly
determined that it did not have to provide for compensatory damages in its offer of full relief
in light of agency's repeated requests for evidence of damages and linkage, to which appellant
responded by merely reiterating her claim).
365. Munson v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01943006, 95 F.E.O.R. 1006, at XI-16
(1994).
366. See id. at XI-17.
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. See id. at XI-17 (stating that appellant sought compensatory damages "to remedy.., her
mental stress and anguish, the psychological damage to herself and her family, her loss ofwages,
the ruining of her credit history, and the ruining of her faith in the federal government").
370. See id. (noting that agency instructed appellant to submit evidence such as "receipts
and/or bills for medical care, medication, transportation to the doctor, psychiatric expenses,
confirmation by other individuals (affidavits), [and] cancelled checks").
371. See id.
372. See id.
373. See i&
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provide evidence substantiating her claim despite ample opportunity
to do so.374
6. Carle revisited-forms of evidence the EEOC does and does not require
to prove nonpecuniary injury and linkage
Although EEOC decisions appear to have blurred the distinction
between objective and other evidence, 75 the rulings nonetheless
universally accept the forms of evidence articulated in Carle v.
Department of the Navy.171 In Carpenter v. Department of Agriculture,177
for example, the appellant offered a fifty-page, unsworn statement and
a brief sworn declaration as evidence of his injury and linkage. 78
In addition to an affidavit from his wife, the appellant adduced
medical records and statements from two physicians and a psychiatrist
extensively corroborating his pain and distress and their connection
to the agency's actions. 9 On the basis of this evidence, the Com-
mission found that the appellant made a sufficient showing of
nonpecuniary damages and established a nexus between the harm
374. See id. at XI-18.
375. Compare Jackson v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01923399,93 F.E.O.1L 3062,
at XII-185 (1992) ("[P]rior to making its offer of full relief, the agency should have requested
from the appellant objective evidence of the alleged damages incurred.... [S]uch proof could
have taken the form of receipts and/or bills for medical care, medication and transportation
to the doctor."), and Carle v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01922369,94 F.E.O.R. 1043,
at XI-50 (1993) ("Other evidence could have taken the form of a statement by appellant
describing her emotional distress, and statements from witnesses, both on and off thejob."), with
Taunton v. Department of Veterans Affairs, E.E.O.C. No. 01943687,95 F.E.O.R. 1349, at XI-268
(1995) ("Objective evidence may include statements from (the complainant] concerning her
emotional pain or suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to
professional standing.... character or reputation, ... credit standing, loss of health, and any
other non-pecuniary losses that are incurred as a result of the discriminatory conduct.").
376. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01933383,96 F.E.O.R. 1026,
at XI-64 (1995) (ordering agency to "request from appellant objective and other evidence ofall
... losses which resulted from the discriminatory [conduct]"); Taunton, 95 F.E.O.R. 1349, at XI-
268 (declaring that "'the agency should have asked appellant to provide objective and other
evidence linking ... the distress to the unlawful discrimination'" (quoting Car!e 94 F.E.O.RL
1043, at XI-50)); Browne v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01944256,95 F.E.O.1. 3230, XII-
151 (1995) ("Statements from others, including family members, friends, health care providers,
[and] other counselors (including clergy) could address the outward manifestations or physical
consequences of emotional distress, including sleeplessness, anxiety, stress, depression, marital
strain, humiliation, emotional distress, loss of self-esteem, excessive fatigue, or a nervous break-
down.");James v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01944466, 95 F.E.O.R. 1034, at XI-91
(1994) ("Objective evidence also may include documents indicating a complainant's actual out-
of-pocket expenses related to medical treatment, counseling, and so forth, related to the injury
allegedly caused by [the agency's] discrimination.").
377. E.E.O.C. No. 01945652, 95 F.E.O.R. 3229 (1995).
378. SeeCarpenterv. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01945652, 95 F.E.O.RL 3229, at XII-
145 (1995).
379. See id. at XII-145 to XII-146.
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and the agency's conduct." ° Accordingly, it awarded the appellant
$75,000 in compensatory damages.ml
The EEOC's discussion in Carpenter also is instructive in that it
clarifies what proof of nonpecuniary damages Carle does not require.
In its FAD denying the appellant's claim for emotional distress
damages, the agency discounted the unsworn statements from the
appellant and his wife because they were not notarized.3 82  Declar-
ing that signed affidavits are not mandatory, the Commission
summarily dismissed the agency's contention.83 In rejecting the
agency's second argument that the statements from the appellant's
health care providers failed to establish the requisite nexus between
the agency's conduct and the appellant's distress, the EEOC noted
that evidence from medical professionals is not necessary for a
showing of intangible injury.' Finally, the Commission objected
to the agency's assertion that the appellant should have presented
statements from "objective third party witnesses."31 In addition to
the fact that outside parties are not likely to be privy to disruptions in
an appellant's marital and family relationships, the EEOC observed
that courts consistently have awarded compensatory damages on the
basis of a plaintiff's testimony alone or in addition to statements from
family members and health care providers.s 6
As the Commission's discussion in Carpenter suggested, a complain-
ant can recover compensatory damages without adducing medical
evidence." 7 In Lawrence v. United States Postal Service,' the appel-
lant filed a sexual harassment complaint. 9 Following a hearing,
the agency accepted the AJ's recommended finding of discrimination
and issued its first FAD, which requested that the appellant provide
380. See id. at XII-146.
381. See id. at XII-147.
382. See id. at XII-146.
383. See id.
384. See i& (acknowledging weight of authority holding that expert testimony is not necessary
to demonstrate intangible injury (citing Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 724 (1st
Cir. 1994))).
385. Id. at XII-146.
386. See id. at XII-146 to XII-147 (citing Sanche., 37 F.3d at 724); see also EEOC Enforcement
Guidanc supra note 22, at *6 (noting that the complainant's '"own testimony may be solely
sufficient to establish humiliation or mental distress' (quoting Williams v. TransWorld Airlines,
660 F.2d 1267, 1273 (8th Cir. 1981))). But see id. at *7 ("[F]or conciliation or settlement
purposes, testimony solely by the complaining party may not be sufficient to establish emotional
harm. There should be corroborating testimony by the complaining party's co-workers,
supervisors, family, friends, or anyone else with knowledge of the emotional harm.").
387. See Carpenter, 95 F.E.O.R. at XII-146.
388. E.E.O.C. No. 01952288, 96 F.E.O.R 3150 (1996).
389. See Lawrence v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01952288,96 F.E.O.R. 3150, at
XII-132 (1996).
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information in support of her compensatory damage claim."' In
response, the appellant submitted a sworn statement detailing the
physical and emotional injuries she suffered as the result of a hostile
work environment created by her supervisor.91 She further indicat-
ed that she did not pursue psychiatric or psychological counsel-
ing.392 Because the appellant proffered no evidence from a health
care provider diagnosing her emotional distress, nor any proof of a
causal connection between the supervisor's or the agency's conduct
and her alleged injuries, the agency issued its second FAD denying
her nonpecuniary damage claim. 93
On appeal, the EEOC reiterated that "'expert testimony ordinarily
is not required to ground money damages for mental anguish or
emotional distress.'""9 The Commission cautioned, however, that
although a complainant's entitlement to a damage award may be
inferred from the nature and severity of the discrimination, 95 the
lack of supporting evidence may limit the recovery deemed appropri-
ate in a given case." 6 In this instance, the appellant's personal
statement averring embarrassment and humiliation was corroborated
by the testimony of three witnesses.397 After reviewing a range of
awards in similar cases from $500 to $35,000, the Commission found
that $3000 appropriately compensated the appellant for her nonpecu-
niary injuries.398 The EEOC noted, however, that the lack of
390. See id. at XII-133.
391. See id. (noting appellant's alleged injuries included headaches, weight loss, nausea,
decreased work performance, irritability, anxiety attacks, diminished social life, embarrassment,
humiliation, and defamation).
392. See id.
393. See id.
394. Id. at XII-134 (quoting Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 724 (1st Cir.
1994)).
395. See id. at XII-135. The EEOC stated that -[the more inherently degrading or
humiliating the defendant's action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would
suffer humiliation or distress from that action; consequently, somewhat more conclusory
evidence of emotional distress will be acceptable to support an award for emotional damages."'
Id. (quoting United States v. Baistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992)).
396. See id.
397. See id. at XII-133. The witnesses testified at the administrative hearing that the
appellant's supervisor often humiliated her with his sexual comments and made her cry on at
least one occasion. See id.
398. See id. at XII-135 (citing Kuntz v. City of New Haven, 3 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1590, 1592 (D.
Conn.) (awarding $500 for mental anguish based on plaintiffs personal statement averring that
he was "disappointed" and "embarrassed" at not having been promoted), affid without opinion,
29 F.3d 622 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 667 (1994); Sassaman v. Heart City Toyota, 66 Fair
Empl. Prac. Gas. 1230, 1236 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (finding that $2000 in nonpecuniary damages was
appropriate compensation in sexual harassment case based in part on plaintiffs testimony
relating degradation she felt as result of conduct of several supervisors); Turic v. Hospitality
House, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 544, 557 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (awarding $50,000 in nonpecuniary
compensatory damages stemming from sex and religion discrimination in wrongful termination
case); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 823 F. Supp. 571, 575 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that
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supporting medical evidence limited her compensatory damage award
insofar as the sum did not encompass the alleged physical manifesta-
tions of her emotional distress.3 99
Although the Commission has awarded nonpecuniary damages on
the basis of a complainant's testimony, it also has denied awards in
cases where the complainant failed to provide a statement describing
his injuries and their causal connection to the alleged discrimina-
tion.4" Indeed, the EEOC has ascribed particular import to an
appellant's personal statement, effectively requiring such evidence to
maintain a claim successfully. For example, the EEOC affirmed a
FAD denying a request for damages for loss of health and mental
anguish in Browne v. Department of Agriculture.4°' In support of her
claim, the appellant submitted an affidavit from her housemate
declaring that as a result of the agency's action, the appellant often
was depressed and suffered from sleeplessness and gastrointestinal
problems." 2 She also offered a letter from a physician describing
the appellant's physical symptoms and stating that she was taking
medication as a result.4 3 The appellant, however, failed to submit
a personal statement detailing her injury.' Emphasizing that a
mere claim for damages filed by counsel is not the equivalent of a
personal statement supporting the request,' ° the Commission
found that the absence of such a statement from the appellant
"severely undermine[d]" her damages claim40 6 and declined to
reverse the agency's decision.0 7
As a practical matter, however, a complainant who submits a
personal statement without medical documentation or statements
from health care providers is unlikely to prevail on her claim for
plaintiff was entitled to $50,000 in nonpecuniary damages in disability discrimination and
wrongful termination case); McAdams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1489, 1494
(D. Minn. 1993) (awarding $35,000 in failure to accommodate case), reod and remanded, 30 F.3d
1027 (8th Cir. 1994)).
399. See id. at XII-135 to XII-136 n.7.
400. See Wreford v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01942404, 96 F.E.O.R. 3002, at
XII-7 (1995) (denying compensatory damages for pain and suffering when complainant merely
claimed damages in her complaint without providing personal statement documenting alleged
injury).
401. E.E.O.C. No. 01944256, 95 F.E.O.R. 3230, at XII-153 (1995).
402. See Browne v. Department of Agric., E.E.O.C. No. 01944256, 95 F.E.O.R. 3230, XII-152
(1995).
403. See id.
404. See id. at XII-152 to XII-153.
405. See id.; see also Rivera v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01934157, 94 F.E.O.R.
3522, at XII-368 (1994) (observing that letter from complainant's attorney merely stating
complainant's claim, without supporting evidence, falls short of type and extent of proof
necessary to substantiate entitlement to compensatory damages).
406. Browne, 95 F.E.O.R. 3230, at XII-152.
407. See id. at XII-153.
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compensatory damages. °8 Medical evidence serves to corroborate
the injuries alleged by a complainant and often establishes the
requisite linkage between the damages incurred and the agency's
unlawful discrimination. °9
Medical evidence can prove to be the proverbial double-edged
sword, however. While the diagnosis of a psychologist or physician
aids in establishing that a complainant suffered emotional distress or
physical ailments, it also may limit substantially the extent of recovery
to which the EEOC finds a complainant is entitled. In Rountree v.
Department of Agriculture,41° for instance, the appellant averred a wide
variety of nonpecuniary losses resulting from the agency's purportedly
discriminatory performance appraisal and requested compensatory
damages for "stress-related problems," including his physical abuse of
his wife and his hostility towards whites.4 ' In support of his damage
claim, the appellant submitted a clinical psychologist's diagnosis of his
depression.412 Citing the diagnostic criteria on which the psycholo-
gist relied in identifying the appellant's condition, the Commission
found that the appellant's depression was not severe." Similarly,
the EEOC declined to award any damages for losses attendant to his
408. See, e.g., Taylor v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01940376, 94 F.E.O.R. 3528,
at XII-386 to XII-387 (1994) (determining that appellant's personal statements averring damages
and linkage were insufficient to show that purported nonpecuniary damages and medical bills
resulted from agency's unlawful conduct alleged in complaint); Caudle v. United States Postal
Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01930473, 94 F.E.O.R. 3163, at XII-50 (1993) (finding that appellant was not
entitled to compensatory damages because he only made general claim for emotional distress
without medical documentation specifying injury); see also EEOCEnforcement Guidance, supra note
22, at *6 ("The Commission will typically require medical evidence of emotional harm to seek
damages for such harm ....").
409. See, e.g., Brandenberger v. Department of the Army, E.E.O.C. No. 01921751, 94 F.E.O.R.
3361, at XII-562 (1994) (reversing agency's finding of no discrimination and remanding issue
of compensatory damages for further processing in light of letter from appellant's psychiatrist
stating that "the extreme form of sex-based harassment suffered by appellant caused her to
experience ... emotional distress as well as an inability to work"); supra notes 215-17 and
accompanying text (discussing medical evidence corroborating appellant's purported injuries
and establishing causal nexus between nonpecuniary injury and agency's conduct in Carpenter).
Adducing evidence of linkage is particularly important because, as the Commission observed
in James v. United States Postal Service, "[in determining damages, the agency is only required to
consider objective evidence of damages shown to be a result of the alleged discrimination; the
agency is not responsible for remedying pre-existing conditions or for rectifying an individual's
health problems in general." E.E.O.C. No. 01944466, 95 F.E.O.R. 1034, at X-91 (1995); see also
EEOC Enforrement Guidance, supra note 22, at *5 ("An award for emotional harm is warranted
only if there is sufficient causal connection between the respondent's illegal actions and the
complaining party's injury. The discriminatory act or conduct must be the cause of the
emotional harm.") (citation omitted).
410. E.E.O.C. No. 01941906, 95 F.E.O.R. 3223 (1995).
411. SeeRountree v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01941906,95 F.E.O.R. 3223, at XII-
120 (1995).
412. See id. at XII-121.
413. See id. at XII-123 (observing that although appellant represented that his depression was
severe, major depressive episodes were not indicated by psychologist's diagnosis).
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violent behavior and general hostility towards whites, in part because
neither was symptomatic of his condition.
4 14
Furthermore, medical records might disclose alternative causes of
a complainant's physical and psychological illnesses unrelated to the
agency's discriminatory conduct, thereby mitigating the damages
award. In Smith v. Department of Defense,415 for example, the agency
sought to deny the appellant's compensatory damages claim on the
basis that extraneous factors caused her emotional distress. The
appellant in Smith alleged that her supervisor subjected her to
continuous sexual harassment consisting of unwelcome physical
contact, sexual comments, invitations to have sex, and sexual
innuendos.416 In support of her damages claim, the appellant
submitted evidence of her emotional distress and medical treatment,
including a report from her therapist, medical bills, and several
hundred pages of hospital records. 7  The agency's FAD deter-
mined that the appellant had been the victim of a hostile work
environment, but denied her compensatory damages request despite
the voluminous evidence of her physical and emotional injury
adduced by the appellant.41 Because the appellant's documenta-
tion of her injuries revealed a history of mental illness, the agency
concluded that most of her emotional harm had stemmed from
"other factors."419  Thus, the agency contended, the appellant
"failed to establish 'with requisite certainty that the sexual harassment
caused her emotional problems and [required] medical treat-
ment."
420
On appeal, the EEOC reversed the agency's FAD with regard to the
denial of the compensatory damages claim and awarded $25,000 for
nonpecuniary damages. 42 1  Although the Commission concurred
with the agency's finding that the appellant had a history of depres-
414. See id. at XII-124 to XII-125.
415. E.E.O.C. No. 01943844, 96 F.E.O.R. 3164 (1996).
416. See Smith v. Department of Defense, E.E.O.C. No. 01943844, 96 F.E.O.R. 3164, at XII-
188 (1996).
417. See id. at XII-189.
418. See id. at XII-188.
419. See id. at XII-192. In addition to the hostile work environment and sexual harassment,
the agency cited the following additional factors contributing to the appeIlant's emotional harm:
"(a) a dysfunctional family (including an alcoholic father, an abusive mother, a childhood
kidnapping, and an adolescent rape); (b) four marriages to abusive or alcoholic men; (c) prior
alcohol and substance abuse; (d) a manic depressive son, a critical daughter, and three
demanding grandchildren; (e) smoking; (f) a new boyfriend; [and] (g) financial problems
including a bankruptcy filing." Id.
420. it at XII-188 (quoting unreported agency decision denying request for compensatory
damages).
421. See id. at XII-195.
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sion, it determined that the sexual harassment aggravated her pre-
existing emotional condition to such a degree that she required
hospitalization and extensive therapy.4 2  Therefore, she was
entitled to compensation to the extent that the agency's conduct
exacerbated her depression.423 Although the appellant in Smith
ultimately prevailed on her damages claim, the case still illustrates the
risk inherent in revealing medical records that disclose possible causes
of mental and physical injury distinct from the agency's alleged
discrimination. An agency seeking to mitigate, if not refute, a
damages claim will cite other causative factors identified in the
complainant's medical history to demonstrate that the complainant
has failed to satisfy the causal nexus Jackson requires to prove an
entitlement to damages.
Finally, medical records and statements from health care providers
do not insure a compensatory damage award.424 When the medical
documentation merely recites a complainant's injuries without
opining that the agency's conduct actually inflicted the harm, it will
not establish the necessary causal nexus between the purported injury
and the alleged discriminatory conduct.42 It follows that when
medical documentation links a complainant's distress to the agency's
action, a complainant is in a much stronger position to recover
compensatory damages.
7 Medical records and the issue of privacy
Given the significance of medical records and physicians' statements
in demonstrating (and refuting) a claim for damages, the issue arises
of whether a complainant can assert a privacy right to shield such
documents from agency inquiry. The EEOC answered this question
in the negative.
The Commission stated its policy on the issue of medical records
and a complainant's privacy in Carpenter v. Department of Agricul-
ture.4 6  In that case, the appellant argued he was entitled to the
maximum award of compensatory damages permitted by the
422. See id. at XII-193.
423. See id.
424. See Browne v. Department of Agric., E.E.O.C. No. 01944256, 95 F.E.O.RL 3230, at XII-
152 to XII-153 (1995) (affirming FAD denying appellant's request for compensatory damages
despite statement from complainant's physician outlining her nonpecuniary injuries).
425. See id. at XII-152 (finding that appellant's showing was deficient not only due to glaring
absence of personal statement, but also because physician's statement merely describing her
emotional distress and physical ailments failed to establish that agency's action caused decline
of her health).
426. E.E.O.C. No. 01945652, 95 F.E.O.1R 3229 (1995).
242
ASSESSING NONPECUNIARY DAMAGES
settlement agreement because the agency breached the agreement's
privacy provisions by seeking his medical records without first securing
his consent.427  The EEOC rejected the appellant's contention,
noting that he "made his medical condition an issue subject to agency
examination and review" by virtue of his request for damages related
to emotional distress and medical expenses.2
In addition to requiring the production of all pertinent medical
documentation available, the Commission has indicated that a
complainant may have to reveal certain deeply personal information
in order to sustain a request for compensatory damages.429 In
Rivera v. Department of the Navy,430 for example, the appellant sought
$300,000 in compensatory damages for both pecuniary and nonpecu-
niary harm stemming from his termination that allegedly was
motivated by racial and gender discrimination. Prior to making
an offer, the agency requested objective and other evidence substanti-
ating his claim, to which the appellant's attorney responded by
describing the purported injuries.43 2 Through the agency's internal
administrative appeal process, the appellant was reinstated to another
position before the agency issued its FAD. 43' That fact, in addition
to the agency's determination that the appellant failed to provide
sufficient evidence of nonpecuniary damages or that his termination
caused the alleged harm, prompted the agency to cancel the claim for
mootness.' The appellant contended on appeal that his new
position was inferior to his prior post and that the agency therefore
427. See Carpenter v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01945652,95 F.E.O.R. 3229, at XII-
144 (1995).
428. See id. at XII-144 & n.2 (citing Smith v. Logansport Community Sch. Corp., 193 F.R.D.
637, 649 (N.D. Ind. 1991) ("[B]y asserting a claim for emotional distress [plaintiff] has placed
her mental and emotional condition in issue and ... the defendants are entitled to records
concerning any counseling she may have received."); Tramm v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 128 F.R.D.
666, 668 (N.D. Ind. 1989) ("Since the plaintiff has placed her mental and emotional condition
in issue, the defendants are entitled to any medical records concerning previous mental health
counseling received by the plaintiff."); Lowe v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 296,
298-99 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("So long as [the] plaintiff seeks compensatory... damages by reason
of physical, mental or emotional harm or distress, [the] defendant is entitled to inquire during
discovery of wimesses, including physicians and psychiatrists, as to [the] plaintiff's past history
whether or not directly related to herjob .... ")); see also EEOCEnforcement Guidance, supra note
22, at *5 n.14 (informing complaining parties that "if they claim emotional harm, respondents
may be able to obtain records of medical and/or psychiatric treatments for conditions relevant
to the complained of symptoms").
429. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 22, at *5 n.14 ("A respondent may also obtain
relevant information concerning the complaining party's private life.").
430. E.E.O.C. No. 01934157, 94 F.E.O.R 3522 (1994).
431. See Rivera v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01934157, 94 F.E.O.R. 3522, at XII-
367 (1994).
432. See id.
433. See id.
434. See id.
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had improperly dismissed the complaint as moot.35 Additionally,
the appellant petitioned that the agency rescind its decision denying
his claim for compensatory damages. 6 The EEOC found that it
could not determine from the record whether the position to which
the agency had reinstated the appellant was "substantially equiva-
lent"43 7 to his previous assignment and so remanded the matter for
further investigation." On the issue of the appellant's entitlement
to compensatory damages, the Commission noted that the letter from
the appellant's attorney requesting damages without supporting
evidence fell short of the "type and extent of proof' necessary to
establish an entitlement to compensatory damages. 9 Accordingly,
the EEOC directed the agency to advise the appellant on remand of
the need to present additional objective and other evidence to
establish an entitlement to compensatory damages.440 Moreover,
the Commission instructed the agency to inform the appellant that he
"may need to present personal and sensitive information to the
agency to show that the injury is linked solely or partially to the
alleged discriminatory conduct.""'
The EEOC's holding in Munson v. Department of the Navy"
illustrates the likely consequence of invoking the aegis of privacy to
conceal personal matters from the agency's view. The appellant in
Munson alleged reprisal and sought $300,000 for nonpecuniary and
pecuniary losses.' 4 The agency instructed her to submit objective
and other evidence of the damages she purportedly incurred and how
they were related to the discrimination.'5 Asserting a right to
privacy, the appellant refused the agency's repeated requests for
further documentation.' 5  The agency extended an offer of full
relief, which she rejected on the ground that it denied her request for
435. See id. at XII-368 (contending that "although he was reinstated to the same title with the
same salary as his previous position, his duties under the new position [were] a sham in that he
[was] required to wear gym clothes").
436. See id.
437. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(b) (1) (i) (1996) (requiring that when agency or Commission
finds that applicant for employment has been discriminated against, "the agency shall offer the
applicant the position that the applicant would have occupied absent discrimination or... a
substantially equivalent position").
438. See Rivera, 94 F.E.O.R. at XII-368.
439. See id.
440. See id. at XII-369.
441. Id
442. E.E.O.C. No. 01943006, 95 F.E.O.R. 1006 (1994).
443. SeeMunson v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01943006,95 F.E.O.R. 1006, at XI-
16 to XI-17 (1994).
444. See id. at XI-17.
445. See id.
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compensatory damages.' On appeal from the agency's FAD
cancelling her complaint, the Commission ruled in favor of the
agency as to the issue of compensatory damages, concluding that the
agency properly denied compensatory damages in making its offer of
full relief absent sufficient proof of harm and linkage.
447
8. Denying a compensatory damage claim
Adducing evidence of injury and linkage does not guarantee an
award of compensatory damages, however. In addressing the issue of
compensatory damages, the EEOC employs a "bifurcated approach"
in which it first determines whether the complainant succeeded in
making a prima facie claim of damages and linkage (which, as
discussed previously, is a low threshold to satisfy),' and then
considers whether the evidence is sufficient to establish an entitle-
ment to compensatory damages."9  To satisfy the latter inquiry, a
complainant must demonstrate four elements of proof: (1) the
nature of the harm suffered; (2) the duration of the harm; (3) the
severity of the injury; and (4) the causal relationship between the
agency's action and the purported harm.41°
The Commission's discussion in Brandenberger v. Department of the
Navy45' exemplifies this bifurcated analysis. In that case, the appel-
lant alleged sexual harassment by co-workers, which the AJ found did
occur.452 However, the AJ determined that she was not entitled to
compensatory damages, even though at the hearing the appellant
submitted a letter from a psychiatrist detailing her injury and linking
it to the ongoing harassment.453  The agency rejected the AJ's
finding of discrimination, prompting her appeal.' In reversing the
agency's FAD and remanding the complaint for further processing,
the Commission directed the appellant to provide additional
documentation of her damages and linkage.455  Although the
446. See id.
447. See id. at XI-18.
448. See supra Part II.C.4 (discussing relative ease with which complainant may raise prima
facie claim for compensatory damages).
449. See Hemingway, supra note 17, at 697 (identifying bifurcated approach EEOC
consistently applies in assessing claims for compensatory damages).
450. See Rountree v. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01941906,95 F.E.O.R. 3223, at XII-
122 (1995) (discussing evidentiary standard for establishing entitlement to compensatory
damages).
451. E.E.O.C. No. 01921751, 94 F.E.O.R. 3361 (1994).
452. See Brandenberger v. Department of the Army, E.E.O.C. No. 01921751, 94 F.E.O.R.
3361, at XII-561 to XII-562 (1994).
453. See id.
454. See id.
455. See id. at XII-565.
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psychiatrist's letter sufficed to raise a prima facie claim for compensa-
tory damages, it did not, standing alone, satisfy the evidentiary
standard necessary to establish entitlement to an award. 56
In addition to examining the sufficiency of the evidence proffered,
the Commission also looks to the nature of the alleged discrimination
itself in determining whether the record warrants an award of
compensatory damages.457 In Sanich v. United States Postal Ser-
vice,458 for instance, the appellant alleged that the agency harassed
him in reprisal for prior EEO activity by removing a telephone from
his work space 9 and nine months later replaced the desk at which
he sorted mail with a "carrier/clerk case" unsuitable for his work
restrictions." To substantiate his claim for compensatory damages,
the appellant submitted a personal statement averring "constant
harassment" and describing the physical and psychological manifesta-
tions of his emotional distress, statements from his wife and son
supporting the appellant's representations of mental anguish, and a
statement from a clinical psychologist relating the appellant's
depression and anxiety.461  Affirming the agency's determination
that the appellant failed to prove an entitlement to damages with
regard to the first incident, the Commission noted that the agency's
removal of the telephone "is insufficient as a matter of law to permit
recovery of compensatory damages for emotional distress."462
Moreover, the EEOC concluded that in both complaints, the
appellant did not make a showing of harassment sufficient to justify
an award of compensatory damages.4" The EEOC declared that
"[u] nless an incident of alleged harassment was particularly egregious
or knowingly directed at an individual particularly susceptible to
456. See Hemingway, supra note 17, at 697.
457. See Gjersvold v. Department of the Treasury, E.E.O.C. No. 01941041, 94 F.E.O.R. 3370,
at XII-591 (1994) (holding that appellant failed to show how purported injury was related to
alleged discrimination in part because act which appellant challenged did not constitute
actionable discrimination). The appellant in Gjersvo/4 an employee of the Internal Revenue
Service, asserted that a supervisor's comment that the appellant was a "taxpayer advocate"
exacerbated her pre-existing depression. See id. at XII-590. In denying her claim for
compensatory damages, the Commission determined that the supervisor's remark did not rise
to the level of egregious discrimination actionable under Title VII. See id. at XII-591. Moreover,
the EEOC noted that "when an allegation fails to render a complainant aggrieved for purposes
of Title VII ... , it will not be converted into a processable claim merely because the
complainant has requested a specific relief." Id.
458. E.E.O.C. No. 01944926, 96 F.E.O.R. 3004 (1995).
459. SeeSanich v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01944926,96 F.E.O.R. 3004, at XII-
12 (1995).
460. See id.
461. See id.
462. Id. at XII-13.
463. See id.
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emotional injury, isolated or infrequent actions alleged to be
harassing will not result in an award of compensatory damages for
emotional distress.
Similarly, in Stith v. Department of the Navy4 the EEOC determined
that the alleged discrimination was insufficient to support a claim for
damages. The appellant in Stith contended that the agency discrimi-
nated against her on the basis of her race and in reprisal for prior
EEO activity by detailing her to a lower-level position.466 In another
allegation, she asserted that the agency harassed her by placing in her
personnel file a form erroneously overstating the duration of her
assignment to the lesser position. 67 Based on the fact that the
mistake had been corrected, the agency dismissed the allegation
regarding her personnel file for mootness.4" On appeal, she
argued that the alteration of the documents in her personnel records
was ongoing, and that as a result, she was entitled to compensatory
damages for "serious damage to her health, emotional well-being,
professional reputation, and career."469 The Commission affirmed
the agency's decision cancelling her complaint concerning the
changes made to her personnel file, finding that "a mere error in the
completion of a form, absent other evidence of compensable injury,
is insufficient to support a claim for damages. 470
Regardless of whether the alleged discrimination is insufficient to
warrant an award or the evidence adduced in support of the claim
fails to establish an entitlement to damages, the EEOC requires an
agency to justify the denial of compensatory damages in its offer of
full relief.4 71 In Taunton v. Department of Veterans Affairs,4 2 for
example, the appellant alleged sex discrimination and reprisal; the
discrimination involved a statement by a member of agency manage-
ment to the effect that filing an EEO complaint could threaten her
464. Id.
465. E.E.O.C. No. 01943689, 1995 WL 231212 (Apr. 6, 1995).
466. Stith v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. No. 01943689, 1995 WL 231212, at *1 (Apr.
6, 1995).
467. See id at *2 (noting that form transferring appellant to temporary assignment stated that
detail would be effective December 26, 1993, for period not to exceed 120 days, but mistakenly
indicated assignment would not end until May 21, 1994).
468. See id.
469. Id. at *1-2.
470. Id. at *2.
471. Cf Wolf v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01953705, 96 F.E.O.R. 1095, at XI-
236 & n.1 (1995) (affirming agency's omission of compensatory damages in its offer of full
relief, but noting that "it would be preferable for the agency to specifically note its determina-
tion that a complainant is not entitled to compensatory damages in its offer of full relief to
more succinctly close the issue").
472. E.E.O.C. No. 01943687, 95 F.E.O.R. 1349 (1995).
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job and prospects for advancement, whereas the reprisal consisted of
the manager's remark that he would respond honestly if anyone
inquired about whether the appellant had engaged in prior EEO
activity." After investigating her contentions, the agency issued its
FAD finding reprisal.4 74 The FAD did not address whether the
appellant was entitled to compensatory damages. 7 On appeal, the
appellant contested the finding of no discrimination based on sex and
reasserted her claim for compensatory damages . 7  The EEOC
affirmed the agency determination as to the alleged sex discrimina-
tion, but remanded the case for a supplemental investigation of the
appellant's request for compensatory damages related to the repri-
sal.477 Finding that the appellant had raised the issue of compensa-
tory damages prior to the agency's issuance of its FAD and had
adduced evidence in support of her claim, the EEOC concluded that
the agency should have addressed her entitlement to damages in the
FAD.4 7 The Commission thus rejected the notion that the agency's
"mere omission of compensatory damages from the remedy offered
in the FAD ... constitute[d] a determination of [the] appellant's
entitlement."479
Similarly, as the Commission's discussion in Mueller v. United States
Postal Service4"' demonstrates, the EEOC requires AJs to provide an
explanation when they recommend against awarding compensatory
damages."' In Mueller, the appellant alleged sex and disability
discrimination when the agency terminated him during his probation-
ary period and subsequently refused to reinstate him to a position
within the agency.482 By way of relief, he sought $30,000 in compen-
satory damages, averring that he was unable to secure full-time
473. See Taunton v. Department of Veterans Affairs, E.E.O.C. No. 01943687, 95 F.E.O.R.
1349, at XI-266 to XI-267 (1995).
474. See id. at XI-267.
475. See id.
476. See id.
477. See id. at XI-268.
478. See id. at XI-267 to X1-268.
479. 1& at XI-267.
480. E.E.O.C. No. 01942929, 95 F.E.O.R. 3247 (1995).
481. Interestingly, the EEOC does not require AJs to make a finding on the record when
they recommend a particular award of compensatory damages. Kraus Intervieu, supra note 347.
By not requiring an AJ to elaborate in her decision on the manner in which she calculated a
particular award, the EEOC effectively creates a double-standard; an agency is obligated under
Mims to provide such an explanation, as well as an analysis of the connection between the
evidence adduced by the complainant and the sum offered, seesupra Part II.B.3 (discussing Mims
shifting burden of production analysis), whereas an AJ need not do so unless she recommends
against awarding compensatory damages. See infra text accompanying notes 482-89 (discussing
EEOC's requirement thatAJsjustify recommendation against awarding compensatory damages).
482. See Mueller v. United States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01942929, 95 F.E.O.IL 3247, at
XII-198 (1995).
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employment after his termination and as a result, suffered depression
for which he needed hospitalization and ongoing treatment.4 3 A
hearing was held before an EEOC AJ at the appellant's request.
48
Following the hearing, the AJ determined that the agency's reason for
the denial of the appellant's reinstatement request was not credible
and recommended that the agency offer the appellant an entry level
position in addition to back pay and benefits.' The AJ specifically
recommended against a compensatory damage award, but provided
no explanation for the recommendation in her decision. 416 In its
FAD, the agency rejected the AJ's determination of discrimination
with regard to the agency's refusal to reinstate the appellant.487 On
appeal, the Commission concurred with the AJ's finding that the
agency discriminated against the appellant when it denied his
reinstatement request.4" In addition to reversing the FAD, the
Commission remanded the issue of the appellant's entitlement to
compensatory damages for supplemental investigation, noting that the
AJ did not "clearly set forth her reasoning" for her recommendation
that the appellant not receive such an award.489
9. Compensatory damages and dismissals for mootness
The EEOC has stated, "An allegation is deemed 'moot,' when:
(1) there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will
recur; and, (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevoca-
bly eradicated the effects of the alleged violation."49° Thus, when
an agency dismisses a complaint for mootness, it must be sure that
there is not an outstanding issue concerning the complainant's
entitlement to compensatory damages. If the agency does not
recognize that the complainant raised a claim, or otherwise fails to
address the issue, then a question remains whether the offer of full
relief "completely and irrevocably eradicate[s]" the impact of the
alleged discrimination. When the possibility of additional relief in the
form of compensatory damages remains, the EEOC will reverse the
483. See id. at XII-200.
484. See id. at XII-198.
485. See id. at XII-199.
486. See id.
487. See id.
488. See id. at XII-201.
489. Id
490. Smith v. Department of the Treasury, E.E.O.C. No. 01953182, 1995 WL 548421, at *1
(Sept. 8, 1995) (citing County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1614.107(e) (1996) (providing for dismissal of complaint, or portions thereof, when
issues raised therein are moot).
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dismissal and remand the complaint for further investigation of the
appellant's entitlement to compensatory damages.49'
The Commission's ruling in Smith v. Department of the Treasury49 2
demonstrates this point. The appellant in Smith contended that his
manager discriminated on the bases of race and sex by allegedly
compiling adverse information on him, which she then discussed with
other managers, resulting in the cancellation of an assignment to
which he had been detailed previously.493 In addition to written
apologies from the managers identified in his complaint, he sought
a job promotion and compensatory damages.4" Prior to the
resolution of the complaint, the appellant resigned from the
agency.495 Thereupon, the agency issued its FAD cancelling his
complaint for mootness without addressing the appellant's request for
compensatory damages.496 The complainant appealed the dismissal,
and the Commission reversed.497 The EEOC concluded that, absent
a determination in the FAD that the appellant was not entitled to
such an award, there was the potential for compensatory damages
were he to prevail on the merits of his complaint.49 Therefore, the
second prong of the test for mootness was not satisfied.499
III. ASSESSING NONPECUNIARY HARM-A SURVEY OF COMPENSATORY
DAMAGE AWARDS IN 42 U.S.C. § 1981 CASES
With Jackson and its progeny, the EEOC established an analytical
framework for assessing compensatory damage claims. If the
complainant clears the evidentiary and procedural hurdles required
to prove an entitlement to damages, agencies and EEOC AJs must
turn to the task of quantifying a monetary award.
As the EEOC declared in Carpenter, the sum derived must be
commensurate with awards in similar cases." Furthermore, the
491. See Huhn v. Department of the Treasury, E.E.O.C. No. 05940630, 95 F.E.O.R. 3143, at
XII-121 (1995) (affirming lower decision reversing FAD because agency improperly dismissed
complaint where potential for additional relief in form of compensatory damages rendered
complaint not moot).
492. E.E.O.C. No. 01953182, 1995 WL 548421 (Sept. 8, 1995).
493. See Smith v. Department of the Treasury, E.E.O.C. No. 01953182, 1995 WL 548421, at
*1 (Sept. 8. 1995).
494. See id.
495. See id.
496. See id.
497. See id.
498. See id.
499. See id.
500. SeeCarpenterv. Department ofAgric., E.E.O.C. No. 01945652,95 F.E.O.R. 3229, at XII-
147 (1995) (requiring that compensatory damage award satisfy two goals: "that it not be
,monstrously excessive' standing alone and that it be consistent with similar awards made in
250
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Commission has indicated that it will look to discrimination cases
awarding nonpecuniary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for guidance
in addressing the issue of compensatory damages."' Accordingly,
damage awards in § 1981 cases can aid EEO practitioners and EEOC
AJs in determining an appropriate sum under the facts of a given
complaint.
The Appendix surveys nearly forty § 1981 cases awarding compensa-
tory damages for nonpecuniary losses. In addition to the sum
awarded for nonpecuniary damages, °2 the table lists factors that
courts and juries considered in assessing the proper award, including
the nature and severity of the defendant's discriminatory conduct, the
evidence and extent of the plaintiff's intangible harm, and other facts
which were weighed in the determination.
Because § 1981 cases involve only discrimination on the basis of
race or ethnicity,0 3 agencies and EEOC AJs will need to consider
cases awarding damages under other civil rights statutes, such as
§ 19 8 3 ,"' when assessing nonpecuniary damages in complaints
alleging forms of discrimination not based on race or ethnicity. The
sums awarded under § 1981 are instructive even in instances of non-
racial discrimination, however, given the common nature of nonpecu-
niary losses suffered by victims of all forms of unlawful discriminatory
conduct.
similar cases" (quoting Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989)).
501. See EEOCEnforcement Guidance supra note 22, at *5 n.13 ("Cases awarding compensatory
... damages under other civil rights statutes will be used for guidance in analyzing the
availability of damages under § 1981a. Section 1981 cases are particularly useful because
Congress treated the § 1981a damage provisions as an amendment to § 1981."); see also supra
note 35 (quoting language of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
502. Some awards include past pecuniary losses for medical and other expenses. When a
portion of the award is attributable to losses other than nonpecuniary harm, the amount is
noted. SeeJackson v. Pool Mortgage Co., 868 F.2d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 1989) (awarding
$24,421 in compensatory damages, nearly $3000 of which was attributed to medical expenses).
In some cases, compensatory damages were awarded by a general verdict that did not itemize
the award. In those situations, the sum awarded for nonpecuniary damages represents the
portion of the total compensatory damage award not attributable to pecuniary losses. See id.
(awarding $74,146 in total damages, of which $49,725 was attributable to backpay, leaving
$24,421 for intangible injuries and past medical expenses); Block v. R.H. Macy & Co., 712 F.2d
1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1983) (determining that, becausejury award of $20,000 included $7598 in
stipulated wage losses, remaining $12,402 compensated for "mental anguish, humiliation,
embarrassment and stress").
503. See supra note 36 (discussing protection against racial or ethnic discrimination afforded
by § 1981).
504. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
Section 1983 states as follows: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen.., to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable .... " Id. Section 1983 prohibits state
government employers from discriminating on the basis of race, sex, religion, and national
origin. See 2 C. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 22.1.1, at 502 (2d ed. 1988).
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Although no previous discrimination case can dictate the specific
monetary award appropriate under the facts of a given complaint, as
the analysis the EEOC applied in Rountree and Carpenter demonstrates,
a review of similar cases at the very least suggests a range of possible
awards. 5  Though this may, as one commentator has suggested,
constitute "more justification than analysis,"0 6 the EEOC's discus-
sion in Rountree and Carpenter suggests that an agency able to cite case
law militating against the amount sought by the complainant will
stand in a stronger position to defend the lesser award on appeal.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, federal agencies and
administrative judges must assess claims for nonpecuniary damages in
the EEOC administrative process. The Commission has provided
some direction in the matter, erecting an analytical framework that
considers objective and other evidence of the purported harm and
the linkage between the alleged discrimination and the injury. The
Commission also has articulated a standard for measuring the
adequacy of an award for nonpecuniary losses; the sum must not be
"monstrously excessive" standing alone, and it must be commensurate
with awards in similar cases.
Future EEOC rulings awarding specific monetary awards for
intangible injuries will provide further guidance on calculating
compensatory damages in the administrative process. Until the EEOC
builds a body of law based on such decisions, EEO practitioners and
judicial officials will need to rely primarily on cases awarding damages
under other civil rights statutes to gauge a proper award in a given
complaint. In that manner, agencies and EEOC AJs can provide
deserving victims of employment discrimination appropriate compen-
sation for their nonpecuniary losses without awarding excessive sums
that serve to encourage unwarranted claims.
505. See supra notes 185,188, 206 and accompanying text (discussing manner in which EEOC
determined range of awards in Rountree and Carpenter).
506. Hemingway, supra note 221, at V-95-63.
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